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This case study explores the evolution of South African policy on prevention 
of mother to child HIV transmission (PMTCT). It employs the advocacy coalition 
framework developed by Paul Sabatier to analyse the factors that have hindered and 
facilitated the alteration and subsequent implementation ofPMTCT policy. It 
provides a clear illustration of the impact that actors outside of the government can 
have on policy change and policy implementation. The Treatment Action Campaign 
(T AC) and a coalition of its partners exploited opportunities, taking action that led the 
South African government to change its PMTCT policy. After the government 
altered its PMTCT policy, TAC and its partners continued to take action, helping to 
facilitate the implementation of the PMTCT policy. The future of the implementation 














As of July 2004, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) estimated that South Africa was the country with the largest number of 
people living with HIV I AIDS. I South Africa has been severely impacted by the 
mv IAIDS epidemic, posing major challenges to South African society. The South 
African government has been faced with the enormous challenge of responding to the 
epidemic; The government's response has been heavily criticised as being 
unresponsive and insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the epidemic. In 
particular. the government has been criticised for its reluctance to formulate and 
implement policy necessary to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country. This 
pessimistic view of the country's response overlooks the intensive efforts led by civil 
society to influence HIV/AIDS policy - efforts that, as will be demonstrated, have 
produced concrete results. 
This examination will investigate the efforts of the Treatment Action 
. Campaign (T AC) and its partners to facilitate policy change and policy 
implementation of South African prevention of mother to child HIV transmission 
(pMTCT) policy. This study will analyse the development and implementation of 
South African PMTCr policy using the advocacy coalition framework developed by 
Paul Sabatier. The advocacy coalition framework examines the roles that conflict 
between competing groups and changes in external events play in policy change and 
policy implementation. This analysis will demonstrate the influence that TAC and its 
coalition partners have had on PMTCT policy. 
TAC and its coalition partners recognised the South African government's 
reluctance to plan and implement a comprehensive PMTCT programme in the public 
health care system. Initially, TAC and its coalition partners used public mobilisation 
campaigns in an attempt to influence PMTCT policy. When public mobilisation 
proved to be ineffective, they turned to the court system. 
The courts acted as a broker in the conflict between the government and T AC 
and its partners over PMTCT policy. The court issued a handful of rulings favourable 
to TAC and its partners that ultimately lead the government to alter its policy. South 
African PMTCT policy now calls for a comprehensive PMTCT programme in the 
I UNAIDS. 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2004) [Online]. Available at 












public health care system. 
Methodology 
This investigation provides an account of the South Mrican government's 
PMTCT policy, identifying key events, their causes, aDd their impact on PtdTCT 
policy. A variety of primary and secondary source documents were used to 
reconstruct the events that influenced PMTCf policy.2 Primary source documents 
included South African government legislation, strategic plans, operational plans, 
frameworks, guidelines and discussion documents, as well as speeches, statements, 
legislative debates, press releases, and court rulings. Interest group newsletters, press 
releases, research reports and annual reports were alsQ consulted. Secondary source 
documents included newspaper accounts, as well as academic discussions and 
analyses related to lllV/AIDS, PMTCf, and public policy. These documents were 
the foundation for a detailed, although inevitably selective, account of South Mrican 
PMTCT policy. 
2 This case study did not use interviews as a data source. Unfortunately, due to logistical constraints, 












Chapter 1: Implementation Literature Review 
Prior to examining and analysing of the formulation and implementation of 
South African prevention of mother to child HIV transmission (PMTCI) policy, it is 
important to understand of the operational definitions of and theoretical frameworks 
for examining implementation. This chapter will briefly discuss a number of 
operational definitions of "implementation." The chapter will explore the top-do~n 
model, the bottom-up model, and the advocacy coalition framework~ which are used 
to interpret the implementation process. The advocacy coalition framework wiIl 
provide the foundation for the analysis of South African PMTCT policy. 
What Is Implementation? 
An investigation of the academic literature on implementation requires an 
understanding of the concept of "implementation." Scholars studying policy 
implementation have offered operational definitions for the word, a handful of which 
will be briefly examined. 
Policy studies scholars often disagree about the meaning of "implementation" 
because the word has two related, yet distinct meanings. J.E. Lane explains: 
Webster's Dictionary states that 'implementation' means either the act of 
implementing or the state of having been implemented; it presents the following key 
words for 'implement': to carry out: accomplish, fulfil; to give practical effect to and 
ensure of actual fulfIlment by concrete measures, to provide instruments or means of 
practical expression.3 .. 
Similarly, "the Oxford English Dictionary discusses the two definitions: 'to complete, 
perform; to fulfiL"" Notably, implementation can be a verb, connoting an action or 
process, or a noun, indicating an outcome. The dual meaning of the word has lead 
some to focus on implementation as a process, while others view implementation as a 
result or outcome. 
Research in the area of policy implementation is a recent undertaking. 
Scholarly debates about implementation did not attract significant attention until the 
1970's. Initial studies on the subject emerged as part of research on public 
administration. These researchers viewed implementation as an outcome, rather than 
an ongoing prOCess. Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian point out that "to 
administer" and "to implement" were thought of as synonymous in research on public 
3 J.E. Lane, Public Sector (London: Sage, 1995), p. 97. 












administration in the 1970'S.5 
During this period, scholars assumed that the process of implementation 
occurred automatically, as part of the natural workings of the public administration. 
Implementation was the natural functioning of the public administration - a cog in the 
predictable, machine-like processes of the bureaucracy.6 This conceptualisation of 
implementation solely as an outcome overlooked the process of implementation. 
It quickly became evident to scholars that this understanding of 
implementation was far too simplistic. Contrary to the initial beliefs, policy 
implementation was rarely an easy or naturally-occurring process;7 
Later research on implementation expanded its purview, considering 
implementation as both an outcome and as an ongoing process. The implementation 
process became the basis for evaluating the outcome. Lawrence Baum explains: 
Implementation is best defined as the relevant 'actions and inactions of public 
officials who are responsible for helping to achieve objectives contained in 
previously enacted policies. This is a relatively narrow defmition, because it 
excluded extragovernmental activities that help to detennine a policy's ultimate 
impact.8 
Baum also notes: 
Students of the implementation process tend to share the same central interests. 
Scholars have been cOncerned primarily with the effectiveness of the process, both 
descriptively and as an outcome to be explained. Increasingly, attention has been 
focused on the goal of explanation. The imperfections of implementation no longer 
require documentation, so that the major goal of ,research has become one of 
understanding why these imperfections exist and on what bases they vary.9 
Mazmanian and Sabatier elaborate a similar conceptualisation of 
implementation. They state: 
To understand what actually happens after a programme is enacted or formulated is 
the subject of policy implementation: those events and activities that occur after the 
issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include both the effort to 
administer and the substantive impacts on people and events. This definition 
encompasses not only the behaviour of the administrative body which has 
responsibility for the programme and the compliance of target groups, but also the 
web of direct and indirect political, economic, and social forces that bear on the 
behaviour of all those involved, and ultimately the impacts - both intended and 
S Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "Policy Implementation," in Stuart Nagel, Encyclopaedia of 
Policy Studies (New York: Plenum, 1983), p. 143. 
6 Fanie Cloete and Henry Wissink (eds.), Improving Public Policy (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 
2000), p. 167. 
7 Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "Policy Implementation," in Stuart Nagel, Encyclopaedia of 
Policy Studies (New York: Plenum, 1983), p. 143. 
8 Lawrence Baum, "Comparing the Implementation of Legislative and Judicial Policies," in Daniel 
Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Effective Policy Implementation (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1981), pp. 39-40. 












unintended - of the programme. lO 
\ 
This notion of implementation acknowledges the influence of actors outside of the 
government sector. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier provide an alternative, yet related, definition of 
implementation, stating: 
Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated is 
a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court 
decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates 
the objective(s) to be pursued, and, in a variety of ways, "structures" the 
implenientation process. The process normally runs through a number of stages 
beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs 
(decisions) of the iJnplementing agencies, the compliance of target groups with those 
decisions, the actual impacts - both intended and unintended - of those outputs, 
the perceived impacts of agency decisions, and, finally,il'Oportant revisions (or 
attempted revisions) in the basic structure. I I 
Mazmanian and Sabatier note that policy decisions are not limited to legislative 
action, but can include executive orders or court decisions. They also acknowledge 
that implementation can lead to both intended and unintended results. 
From these definitions, it is possible to abstract a number of key components 
of the concept "implementation." As a number of scholars have discussed: 
• Implementation is the enactment ofa policy decision. 
• These policy decisions can include legislative action, as well as executive 
orders and court decisions. 
• Implementation not only encompasses positive action, but also includes 
relevant inaction. 
• Implementation includes both the intended and unintended conseque~ces of 
action. 
• Implementation encompasses not only the actions and-inactions of government 
officials, but also those of actors outside of the government sector. 
• Ideally, the process of implementation carries out the stipulated objectives of a 
policy decision. 
• Implementation is never a fmal or static state, but rather is a constantly 
evolving process. 
10 Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy (Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, Inc;, 1989), p. 4. 












Recent Implementation Models 
In 1980's and 1990's, two models for analysing implementation were 
predominant. The top-down model and the bottom-up model examine the difficulties 
encountered in the implementation process - aspects which were overlooked in early 
research. Both frameworks acknowledge these complications as an inherent and 
unavoidable part of the implementation process. The models analyse key players and 
mechanisms that facilitate implementation. Both paradigm implicitly offer methods 
for addressing the challenges encountered in the implementation process. 
Top-Down Model 
One of the most influential articulations of the top-down model was elaborated 
in the work of Mazmanian and Sabatier. The top-down model focuses on the policy 
decisions made by government officials, concentrating primarily on policy decisions 
by top officials in the central government. 
Three key observations provide the basis for the top-down model. These 
observations state: 
I. Policy making is an iterath:e process of fonnulation, implementation and 
reformulation, and the distinction between the three should be maintained. 
2. 11te focus should be on the attainment of the stated policy goals, although 
outputs of the implementing agencies and the outcomes of the 
implementation process are both important. 
3. Implementation can be viewed from three quite-different perspectives-the 
initial policymaker or the centre, the field-level implementing officials or 
the periphery, and the actors at whom the programme is directed or the 
target group---but a centre-focused perspective to implementation is 
preferred. 12 
On the basis of these observations, Mazmanian and Sabatier seek to "identify 
the factors that affect the achievement of statutory objectives throughout the entire 
[policy] process." According to the top-down model, top government officials can 
facilitate implementation by formulating detailed policy, so as to ensure the greatest 
degree of control overstreet-level bureaucrats as they cariy out implementation. 
A number of case studies examined by Mazmanian, Sabatier, and various 
other academics have tested the empirical applications of the top-down model.13 The 
case studies uncovered the strengths and weaknesses of the model. 
12 Fanie Cloete and Henry Wissink (eds.), Improving Public Policy (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 
2(00), p. 172. 
13 For a list of case studies testing the empirical applications of the Sabatier and Mazmaoian 
framework, seeTable 1 in: Paul Sabatier, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation 












The evidence confinns the importance of legal structuring, or planning, 
disproving claims that planning is altogether unrealistic. The model stresses the 
manner in which legal structuring by top government officials can help tQ facilitate 
policy implementation.14 This legal structuring is particularly critical for 
implementation of more difficult policies. 
The case studies underscore the need to consider the implementation over 
longer time periods. .. ... [T]he focus in the frameworlc on the fonnulation-
implementation-refonnulation cycle encourage[s] many of our case authors to look at 
a longer time-frame than was true of earlier implementation studies (i.e. ten years 
instead of fOUr)." The focus on the fonnul~tionpimplementation-refonnulation cycle 
would later lead academics to highlight learning as a key factor facilitating 
implementation over an extended timeframe.1S 
Ultimately, the focus on the legally mandated policy objectives, in 
combination with an expanded time span for assessing implementation, results in a 
more optimistic view of policy implementation. 
On one hand, the focus on legally-mandated objectives encouraged scholars to 
carefully distinguish the objectives contained in legal documents from both the 
political rhetoric surrounding policy fonnulation and the tendency of critics to 
evaluate a ~rogramme on the basis of what they mistakenly perceived to be its 
objectives. 6 
The evalua~on of successes in carrying out legally mandated policy objectives over 
an extended period of time has led scholars to reconsider situations that were once 
labelled "policy failures.,,17 
The case studies testing the empirical applications of the top-down model 
demonstrate two major flaws. First, the writers mistakenly emphasise the importance 
of clear and consistent policy objectives. The case studies verify the critics' claims 
that few programmes contain clear and consistent policy objectives. Rather, evidence 
demonstrates that the majority of policies contain a number of conflicting objectives. 
Sabatier refutes this claim in part, noting: 
This does not... preclude the possibility of assessing proglamme effectiveness. 
Instead, it simply means that effectiveness needs to be re-conceptualised into 
'acceptability space' demarcated by the intersection of the ranges of acceptable 
values on each of the multiple evaluative dimensions involved.18 , 
14 Paul Sabatier, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical 
Analysis and Suggested Synthesis," Journal of Public Policy, 6: I (1986); p.27. 
IS Ibid, p. 27. 
16 Ibid, p. 28. 
17 Ibid, p. 30. 












: .. ,..;. 
Second, the case studies demonstrate that while the model examines 
implementation over a longer time frame than previous studies, the framework is not 
specifically useful in examining policy implementation over a decade ormore. 
Sabatier acknowledges that, ''This is because ... [the framework] focuses too much on 
the perspective of programme proponents, thereby neglecting the strategies (and 
learning) by other actors which would provide the cornerstone for a more dynamic 
model."19 
Advocates of the bottom-up model weigh a number of key critiques against 
Mazmanian and Sabatier's framework. First, critics argue that the model's focus on 
officials in the top positions of the government is overstated and neglects to recognise 
the influence of the private sector, street level bureaucrats, and policymakers from 
other policy subsystems.20 
Second, the model is accused of being "difficult to use in situations where 
there is no dominant policy (statute) or agency, but rather a multitude of governmental 
directives and actors, none of them pre-eminent."21 In these situations, the presence of 
mUltiple, potentially conflicting directives makes it complicated for bureaucrats to 
determine which directives they should follow. 
Third, it is contended that the model is "likely to ignore, or at least 
underestimate, the strategies used by street level bureaucrats and target groups to get 
around (central) policy and/or to divert it to their own porposes."22 Lower level 
bureaucrats may find that policy is not fitting to the realities on the ground or to their 
personal interests. While the top-down model would argue that top government 
officials should carefully consider the situation on the ground, the reality is that they 
often cannot; thus, policies may need to be adjusted at the point of implementation to 
fit local circumstances. 
As has been illustrated, the top-down model overemphasises the agency of 
actors at the upper levels of the policy making process, thereby ignoring or 
underestimating the influence of actors at lower levels. The model has not been 
discarded altogether, as certain elements offer valuable insights into the 
implementation process. 
19 Ibid, p. 30. 
20 Ibid, p. 30. 
21 Ibid, p. 30. 












The Bottom-Up Model 
In contrast with the top-down model, the bottom-up model focuses on the 
lower levels of the government. According to this model, "the latitude of those 
charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that... policy is effectively 'made' 
by the people who implement it.'>23 The model identifies "the networks of actors 
involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asks them about their 
goals, strategies, activities, and contacts.'>24 Street-level bureaucrats, rather than top 
government officials, are the key actors in the policy implementation process. 
The model views policy as effectively being formulated by street level 
bureaucrats. Policy is but a collection of words before it enters the implementation 
process and is transformed into realities by street level bureaucrats. "Policy standards 
- establishing requirements for how policy goals shall be implemented - 'represent 
no more than exhortations: they are inanimate messages that must be communicated 
to those in charge of executing the policy. "'15 
Like the top-down model, the· bottom-up model is criticised for being an 
insufficient account of the implementation process. First, opponents claim that the 
bottom-up model overemphasises the importance of bureaucrats in relation to top 
government officials,26 ignoring contributions by top government officials. It also 
may underestimate the indirect influence of top officials through their ability to affect 
the institutional structures in which bureaucrats Operate.27 
Second, "because [the bottom-up model] relies very heavily on the perceptions 
and activities of participants, it is their prisoner - and therefore is unlikely to analyse 
the factors indirectly affecting such behaviour which the participants do not realize." 
Social, economic, and legal factors that influence the perceptions, resources, and 
participation of individual bureaucrats must be accounted for.28 
As has been demonstrated, the bottom-up modeloveremphasises the agency of 
23 Upsky, Michael, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on its Head," in Walter 
Burnham and Martha Weinberg (eds.), American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 
1978). 
24 Paul Sabatier, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical 
Analysis and Suggested Synthesis," Journal of Public Policy. 6:1 (1986), p. 32. 
15 Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky, "Implementation as Evolution," in J. Pressman and A. 
Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 164. 
26 Paul Sabatier, ''Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical 
Analysis and Suggested Synthesis," Journal of Public Policy, 6: I (1986), p. 34. 
27 Ibid, p. 34. 












actors at the lower levels of the policy making process, thereby ignoring or 
underestimating the influence of actors in upper levels of the government. The model 
does provide valuable insights into influence of lower level bureaucrats on the 
implementation process, demonstrating how bureaucrats can playa key role in 
overcoming the impediments that surface as policy is translated into action. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
Sabatier elaborates an alternative approach for analysing policy 
implementation that synthesises key contributions of the top-down and the bottom-up 
models. The advocacy coalition framework views implementation as the result of 
learning by actors involved in the policy process. In short, implementation occurs as 
aCtors find ways to overcome barriers and policy is revised in response. 
The framework focuses on advocacy coalitions, defined as "actors from 
various public and private sectors who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize 
their common goals over time.'t29 The focus on advocacy coalitions erases the 
unnecessary division between top government officials and bureaucrats found in the 
top-down and the bottom-up models. 
Sabatier incorporates elements from the bottom-up model into the advocacy 
coalition framework. He states: 
Consistent with the bottom-uppers, one needs to start from a policy problem or 
subsystem - rather than a law or other policy decision - and then examine the 
strategies employed by relevant actors in both the public and private sectors .at various 
levels of ~overnment as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with their 
objectives. 0 
Both top government officials and street level bureaucrats playa role in policy change 
and policy implementation, and in dealing the complexities encountered in the 
process. 
Sabatier also incorporates elements of the top-down model into the advocacy 
coalition framework. He asserts: 
The manner in which legal and soci~onomic factors structure behaviour options 
need[s] to be incorporated ... This leads to a focus on (1) the effects of soci~nomic 
(and other) changes external to the policy network/subsystem on actors' resources and 
strategies; (2) the attempts by various actors to manipulate the legal attributes of 
governmental programmes in order to achieve their objectives over time; and (3) 
actors' efforts to improve their understanding of the magnitude and factors affecting 
the problem - as well as the impacts of various policy instnunents - as they learn 
29 Ibid, p. 39. 













Policies are influen~ed by both external changes and by internal manipulations. 
Actors seek to understan~ and react to these influences, with the ultimate goal of 
facilitating policy implementation. 
Generally, the advocacy coalition framework is based on five basic premises. 
First, "the process of policy change - and the role of poliCY-Oriented learning therein 
- requires a time perspective of a decade or more.,,32 The focus on an extended time 
span allows learning to result in policy change. Policy change refers to the formal 
creation of new policies or the alteration of existing policies by top government 
officials, which one conventionally thinks of as "policy change." It also incorporates 
elements of the bottom-up model, referring to policy change resulting from alterations 
in the manner in which bureaucrats operationalise policy.33 
Second, "the most useful way to think about policy change over such a time 
span is to focus on 'policy subsystems.",34 Sabatier defines a "policy subsystem" as: 
'The set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy."35 
Third, "policy subsystems will normally involve actors from all levels of 
govemment."36 As was previously pointed out, this premise erases the unnecessary 
division of top government officials and bureaucrats. Sabatier asserts: 
... our conception of policy subsystems should be broadened from traditional notions 
of iron triangles - limited to administrative agencies, legislative committees, and 
interest groups at a single level of government - to include two additional categories 
of actors: (I) journalists, researchers, and policy analysts, who play important roles in 
the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas ... and (2) actors at all 
levels of government active in policy formulation and implementation.37 
The work of this larger range of actors is acknowledged. 
Fourth, "public policies (or programmes) can be conceptualised in the same 
manner as belief systems, i.e. as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about 
how to realize them."38 Policies are merely beliefs formalised .in a policy decision. 
Actors become involved in the policy process to promote their beli,ef system with the 
31 Ibid, p. 39. 
32 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein," Policy Sciences, 21 (1988), p. 131. 
33 Ibid, p. 13 1. 
34 Ibid, p. 131. 
lS Ibid, p. 138. 
36 Hank Jenkins-Smith and Paul Sabatier, "Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework," Journal of 
Public Policy, 14:2 (1994), p. 179. 
37 Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, "'The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment," in 
Paul Sabatier, ed., Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 119. 












goal of having their beliefs incorporated into policy decisions.39 
Fifth, .. theories of the policy process or policy change need to address the role 
played in the process by technical information concerning the magnitude and facets of 
_ the problem, its causes, and the probable impacts or various solutions.'>40 Technical 
information of this sort plays a notable role in the policy process, influencing 
administrative agency and legislative decision-making. 
Based on these five premises, the advocacy coalition framework examines the 
evolution of a policy and its implementation. The framework focuses on advocacy 
coalitions operating in the policy subsystem. "Within the subsystem, it is assumed 
that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of 
people from various organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and 
who often act in concert.''''' Advocacy coalitions are held together by shared beliefs. 
Coalitions are united by shared core beliefs. Members within a coalition may 
differ to some degree in their secondary beliefs. The framework holds that the "core" 
of the shared beliefs of an advocacy coalition is quite resilient and is not changed 
easily42; thus, the foundational beliefs that unite an advocacy coalition are consistent 
over time. As a result, advocacy coalitions tend to be rather consistent over time. 
Sabatier states, "While belief systems will determine the direction in which an 
advocacy coalition (or any other political actor) will seek to more governmental 
programmes, its ability to do so will be critically dependent upon its resources." 
Coalitions mobilise, using available resources, to advocate their particular policy 
beliefs. Coalitions adopt strategies that allow them to assert their policy beliefs.43 
In a policy subsystem, advocacy coalitions compete with the goal. or 
transforming their policy beliefs into policy decisions. Competition among coalitions 
is mediated by what Sabatier calls "policy brokers," whp seek to minimise conflict 
between coalitions and facilitate compromise between competing policy beliefs. The 
role of policy broker is often pl~yed by certain elec:ted officials, such as a chief 
executive, courts, or blue ribbon commissions.44 The mediated outcome of conflict 
between advocacy coalitions forms the basis on which policy and governmental 
39 Ibid, p. 132. 
40 Ibid, p. 118. 
4' Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein," Policy Sciences, 21 (1988), p. 133. 
42 Ibid, p. 141. -
43 Ibid, p. 143. 












programmes are built.45 
Once causal theory and a course of action are agreed upon, a governmental 
programme is implemented. Policy outputs are the operational incarnations of these . 
governmental programmes. In other words, policy outputs are governmental' 
programmes translated into action. Policy outputs produce policy impacts. Policy 
impacts include both intended and unintended impacts that occur as the policy is 
operationalised.46 
Policy outputs and policy impacts are observed by advocacy coalitions who 
continue to be concerned with a policy issue.Sabatier states: 
On the basis of perceptions of the adequacy of governmental decisions and/or the 
resultant impacts, as well as new information arising from search processes and 
external dynamics, each advocacy coalition may revise its beliefs and/or alter its 
strategy.47 
This process is referred to as policy-oriented learning, which comprises "relatively 
enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions which result from experience 
and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives.'>411 
Policy-oriented learning is shaped by "internaUeedback loops,,49 from both 
policy outputs and policy impacts. Policy-oriented learning allows actors to re-
evaluate the secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system. It is the "ongoing 
process of search and adaption [sic] motivated by the desire to realize core policy 
beliefs."50 
Policy-oriented learning of this type is vital to the evolution of a policy, 
facilitating policy implementation over an extended period of time. 
Policy-oriented learning normally entails experimenting with a variety of 
implementing mechanisms over time. Dissatisfaction with the performance of a 
specific mechanism - in terms of either its policy outputs at the operational level or 
its resultant inability to ameliorate the problem - will lead programme proponents to 
re-examine their strategy.51 . 
Policy-oriented learning drives the cycle of policy formulation, policy 
implementation, and policy reformulation. 
The policy process is not only shaped by policy-oriented learning. It is also 
shaped by external events and by system parameters, which have yet to be discussed. 
45 Ibid, p. 133. 
46 Ibid, p. 133. 
47 Ibid, p. 133. 
48 Ibid, p. 133. 
49 Ibid, p. 133. 
50 Ibid, p. 151. 












Sabatier points out that, ··Policy-making in any political system or policy subsystem is 
constrained by a variety of social, legal, and resource features of the society of which 
it is a part."52 Sabatier divides the external factors affecting policy change within a 
subsystem into two main categories: 1.) relatively stable parameters, and 2.) dynamic 
system events. 
Sabatier identifies four relatively stable parameters: 1.) basic attributes of the 
problem area (or good); 2.) basic distribution of natural resources; 3.) fundamental 
cultural values and social structure; and 4.) basic legal structure. Relatively stable 
system parameters are extremely difficult to change; therefore, it is not feasible for 
actors in a policy subsystem to alter these parameters.53 
Sabatier highlights three dynamic system events: 1.) changes in socio-
economic conditions and technology; 2.) changes in subsystem governing coalitions; 
and 3.) policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. In contrastto the 
relatively stable parameters, the dynamic system events are those elements external to 
a policy subsystem that can change over time. As these aspects change, they affect 
the opportunities and the constraints that actors face. Changes in dynamic system 
events can either hinder or facilitate the ability of actors in a policy subsystem to 
assert their policy beliefs. 54 
According to Sabatier, changes in factors external to a policy subsystem can 
shake the foundation of the subsystem. Policy-oriented learning that results from 
internal feedback loops tends to lead actors to revise secondary beliefs. By contrast, 
changes in factors external to a policy subsystem can lead actors to reconsider core 
beliefs - beliefs which are very difficult to change as they are foundational to the 
existence and to the efforts of a policy coalition. 55 
Sabatier provides a diagram (Figure 1.1) summarizing the basic elements of 
the advocacy coalition framework, which were discussed briefly above. This 
framework will be the foundation for the subsequent examination of the formulation 
and implementation of South African policy on prevention of mother to child HIV 
transmission (PMTCT). 
52 Ibid, p. 134. 
53 Ibid, p. 134. 
54 Ibid, p. 136. 













Figure 1.1: The advocacy coalitionframework of policy change 
RELATIVELY STABLE SYSTEM PARAMETERS 
1) Basic attributes of the problem area (good) POLICY SUBSYSTEM 
2) Basic distribution of natural resources 
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4) Basic constitutional structure (rules) I--
Constraints Coalition A Policy Brokers Coalition B 
and a) Policy beliefs a) Policy beliefs 
Resources b) Resources b) Resources 
of t-- I I EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) EVENTS 
1) Changes In soc.lo-economlc conditions 
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Actors re: guidance re: guidance 2) Changes In systemic governing coalitions 
3) Policy decisions and Impacts from other subsystems Instruments Instruments 









Source: Sabatier. 1993 
56 Paul Sabatier, "Policy Change over a Decade or More," in Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, eds;, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach 













Chapter 2: Prevention of Mother to Child mv Transmission and the 
South African Government 
The InV/AIDSepidemic in South Africa is extremely complex, multifaceted, 
and rapidly evolving. Responses to the epidemic have been correspondingly 
complicated, and ever changing. Prevention efforts, including prevention mother to 
child InV transmission (PMTCI') efforts, lie at the core of the response. This chapter 
will provide a brief sketch of the HIV I AIDS epidemic in South Africa, focusing on 
the mv prevalence statistics among women of childbearing age, and the implication 
of high infection rates among this population. The chapter will discuss mother to 
child HIV transmission, highlighting medical interventions that can be employed to 
prevent mv transmission from mother to child. The discussion will subsequently 
address the key policy decisions made by the South African government on PMTCT, 
tracking the evolution of the policy stances related thereto. Lastly, the discussion will 
consider the many controversies pertaining to PMTCT efforts and the government's 
contentious policy decisions. 
The. narrative provided in this chapter is an inevitably selective account of 
mv I AIDS and PMTCT policy in South Africa; however, a basic account of the 
situation is a necessary foundation for the subsequent analysis of the evolution of the 
South African government's PMTCT policy. 
HIVlAlDS in South Africa and Mother to Child HIV Transmission 
The mv I AIDS epidemic in South Africa has grown at a rapid pace. In 2003, 
the Joint United Nations Programme on mv/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimated that 
approximately 5.3 million people in South Africa were living with mv.57 As of July 
2004, UNAIDS estimated that South Africa was the country with the largest number 
57 UNAIDS, "South Africa: Epidemiological Fact Sheets," (2004) [Online). Available at 
http://www.unaids.org. [l October 2004J, p. 2. The exact statistics for prevalence of HIV/AIDS are 
unknown. UNAIDS estimates that between 4.5 million (low estimate) and 6.2 million (high estimate) 
South Africans were living with HIV in 2003. UNAms acknowledges: "The cutrent estimates do not 
claim to be an exact count of infections. Rather, they use a methodology that has thus far proved 
accurate in producing estimates that give a good indication of the magnitude of the epidemic in 
individual countries. However, these estimates are constantly being revised as countries improve their 
surveillance systems and collect more information" .(UNAIDS, 2004 Report on the Global AIDS 
Epidemic, 2004: 2). In South Africa, "Reliable statistics on mV/AIDS deaths in South Africa are not 
available despite Government's extensive, and largely successful, efforts to improve the national vital 













of people living with HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS epideniic in South Africa is a 
generalised epidemic, affecting all segments of society. In South Africa. the vast 
majority of HIV infections are in people in their prime reproductive years~S8 The large 
number of people living with HN I AIJ)S has and will continue to pose a major 
challenge for South Mricanpolicy makers. 
UNAIDS estimates on HIV prevalence in countries with generalised 
epidemics are based largely on data from pregnant women attending antenatal 
clinics.59 In South Africa. HN prevalence statistics from antenatal clinics have been) 
/ 
collected in since 1990. The antenatal clinic data have shown a steady and notable 
increase in HIV infection rates among women attending public antenatal clinics.60 
r· 
Infection rates among pregnant women grew from 0.55 percent in major urban areas 
and 0.38 percent outside major urban areas in 1990; to 12.03 percent in major urban 
areas and 8.3 percent outside major urban areas in 1995; to 24.3 percent in major 
urban areas and 22.9 percent outside major urban areas in 2000.61 
The high prevalence among females in their prime reproductive years is 
problematic because.HIV can be transmitted from mother to child during pregnancy, 
labour and delivery, and after delivery through breast milk. According to the United 
Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF), .in the absence of intervention to 
prevent mother to child HN transmission (MTCf), approximately 35 percent of 
children born to HIV -positive mothers will be infected with HN through mother to 
child transmission. Each year, approximately 700,000 children worldwide are 
infected with HIV through MTCf. These infections account for over 90 percent of 
paediatric infections. Of the 700,000 paediatric infections, approximately 15 to 20 
percent are infected during pregnancy, approximately 50 percent during delivery, and 
approximately 33 percent through breast milk.62 In South Africa. an estimated 70,000 
children are infected each year through MTCf.63 
Advances in medical technology have made it possible to prevent mother to 
sa Clive Evian, "Policy Guideline and Recommendation for Feeding of Infants of HIV Positive 
Mothers," n.d. [Online]. Available at http://www.doh.gov.zalaidsldocslfeeding.html. [22 April 2005]. 
S9 UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2004) [Online]. Available at 
i!ttp:l/data.unaids.orglpublGlobalRep0rt!2OO612006_GR-CH02_en.pdf. [6 August 2006], p. 10. 
60 UNAIDS, "South Africa: Epidemiological Fact Sheets," (2004) [Online]. Available at 
http://www.unaids.org. [l October 2004], p. 2 
61 Ibid, p. 4. 
62 UNICEF, "Prevention of parent-to-child transmission of HlV/ AIDS," n.d. [Online]. Available at 
http://www.unicef.orglaidslindex--J>leventionMTCf.html. [6 August 2006]. 
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child HIV transmission. As of 2000, PMTCT strategies included: 
• Voluntary counselling and testing of the mother during pregnancy; 
• Tennination of pregnancy; 
• Therapeutic intervention~. such as 
• Provision of vitamin A to prevent vitamin A deficiencies. 
• ~unotherapy.and 
• Treatment of sexually transmitted infections; 
• Obstebic interventions. such as 
• A voidance of invasive tests 
• Birth canal cleansing. [andJ 
• Caesarean section delively; 
• Modification of infant feeding practices. including 
• 1be choice to avoid breastfeeding 
• Early cessation of bre8stfeeding 
• Heat treatment of expressed breast milk. [andJ 
• Exclusive breast feeding rather than mixed feeding; 
• Anti-retroviral therapy. including 
• ARVs (antiretroviral drugs) to the mother to reduce the viral load in the mother's 
blood 
• AZf or Nevirapine to both the mother and child to reduce the rate of MfCT.64 
Through these interventions. it is possible reduce to reduce the chances that an HIV-
positive mother will transmit HIV to her child. 
Development of Antiretroviral Drugs for Preventing MTCT 
Antiretroviral drugs, such as AZf and Nevirapine, have provided the greatest 
promise in the fight against MTCT. Antiretrovirals reduce the chances that a woman 
will transmit HIV to her child during pregnancy, labour and delivery. Antiretroviral 
drugs (ARVs) are useful in PMTCT for two reasons: 
1. ARVs will lower the viral load of the modter. thereby reducing the risk of 
transmission in'the womb, during labour and during birth. The duration of treatment 
would determine how low the viral load in the breast milk will' be and could 
therefore also reduce the risk of transmission through breastfeeding. 
2. ARVs can by used as a post-exposure prophylaxis for an infant who has contracted 
the virus in the womb. during labour. during birth or to a limited extent through 
breastfeeding.65 
Major studies examining the use ofAZf for PMTCT commenced in 1994 in 
the United States, with a number of key studies following in 1996 in TI,lailand, 
Burkina Faso and C6te d'Ivoire, and later in South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. The 
studies concluded: 
A range of AZf regimens can significandy reduce MfCf of HIV. Each individual 
regimen has a variety of advantages and disadvantages with respect to potential toxicity. 
Regimens also differ in degrees of practicality and feasibility for implementation. On the 
64 Anneke Meerkotter. Susie Bullington. Taryn Young. Amanda Swawr. and Caron Heyes. ~other-to­
Child Transmission of HIV: A Guide for Health Workers and HIVlAlDS Trainers (2000) [Online}. 
Available at http://www.tac.org.za. [16 June 2005J. pp. 10-20. 












question of toxicity it is importarit to hote that the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
considers Azr to have an acceptable clinical safety profile~ For the prevention of MfCT, 
the WHO specifically places Azr on its essential drug list, as an indispensable drug that 
should be made available at all times, in adequate amounts and in the appropriate dosage 
formulations. 66 
.. The studies of AZf demonstrated the potential for preventing MTCT. 
AZf, however, was not simple to administer. The AZf regiment for PMTCT 
required patients to adhere to a rather intensive medication regimen. The standard 
regimen of AZf for PMTCT required the mother to take the medication daily from 
the fourteenth week of pregnancy, and required the baby to take the medication daily 
for the first six weeks after birth. In situations where this regimen was too expensive 
or too difficult to administer, two pills could be administered daily to the mother from 
the thirty-sixth week of pregnancy, and one pill every two hours during labour. 
Combining AZf with caesarean section delivery and exclusive formula feeding 
helped reduce the chances of transmitting HIV from mother to child to almost 
nothing.67 
By the late 1990' s, AZf was available on the global market; however, a 
regimen of AZf was extremely expensive. In 1999, the price of treating one woman 
with AZf and formula to replace breast milk in South Mrica was R500 for a single 
treatment package.68 In the context of resource-limited developing countries, the 
expense of administering AZf was a cost that constrained health care systems would 
find difficult to bear. 
By 1998, the Ugandan HIVNET012 trial uncovered the potential of a second 
drug, Nevirapine. for preventing MTCT. HIVNET012 researchers concluded that 
Nevirapine was promising because it was simple, cheap and could be used widely.69 
Ne,:irapine was easier to administer than AZf, requiring a simple regimen of one pill 
administered to the mother during labour, and one pill administered to the child 
between 24 and 72 hours after birth. Furthermore, a dose of Nevirapine was 
significantly cheaper than AZf. After 8 January 2001, one dose of Nevirapine cost a 
mere RIO, providing hope for a financially feasible means of preventing MTCT. 
The HIVNET012 study revealed the promise for Nevirapine, coupled with 
66 Ibid, pp. 20-23. 
67 Virginia van der Vliet, "AIDS: Losing 'The New Struggle' ," Daedalus, 130: I (2001), p. 166. 
68 Judith Soal, "I'll Be There In the Front," (:ape Times, 26 March 1999. 
69 Anneke Meerkotter, Susie Bullington, Taryn Young, Amanda Swawr, and Caron Heyes, Mother-to-
Child Transmission of H/V: A Guidefor Health Workers and HlVlAlDS Trainers (2000) [Online]. 












exclusive formula feeding, in preventing mother to child HIV transmission.70 In a 
situation where an HIV-positive pregnant women is not given Nevirapine and where 
she breastfeeds her child, approximately 29 out of 100 babies would be HN -positive 
if the mother breastfed the child for six months, and approximately 31 out of 100 
babies would be HIV-positive if the mother breastfed the child for 12 months. 71 In 
other words, without Nevirapine Of exclusive formula feeding, the transmission rate 
from mother to child is approximately 30 percent. Nevirapine and exclusive formula 
feeding help to reduce this 30 percent transmission rate. 
In a situation where Nevirapine was administered to 100 HIV -positive, 
pregnant women, and where the mothers breastfed, approximately 20 out of 100 
babies would be HIV -positive after six months of breastfeeding, and approximately 
22 out of 100 babies would be HIV-positive after 12 months ofbreastfeeding. 
Alternatively, in a situation where 100 HIV -positive pregnant women were properly 
administered Nevirapine and where replacement formula feed was used exclusi~ely, 
approximately 13 out of 100 babies would be HIV -positive. 72 Nevirapine, coupled 
with exclusive formula feeding, reduced the rate of mother to child HN transmission 
from approximately 30 percent in the absence of both interventions, to approximately 
13 percent with the use of both Nevirapine and exclusive formula feed. This 
represents a decrease in the rate of HIV transmission of approximately 50 percent. 
The testing of Nevirapine both in the IDVNET012 trial and later in the South' 
African Intrapartum Nevirapine Trials demonstrated that the medication had very few 
side effects. Trials found that Nevirapine occasionally caused skin disease and liver 
problems; however, these side effects were rare. The trials eased fears for many that 
Nevirapine would lead to drug resistant mutations of the virus. The studies concluded 
that Nevirapine did not lead to permanently resistant mutations in either the mother or 
the child. While the single dose of Nevirapine caused resistant mutations to appear in 
the body, the resistant mutations only remained in the body for a short period of time 
and were harmless.73 
With both AZf and Nevirapine, the drugs needed to be coupled with an 
effective HIV counselling and testing programme. In order to intervene to prevent 
70 Ibid. p. 27. 
71 David McCoy, Mitch Besser, Ronel Visser and Tanya Doherty, Interim Findings on the National 
PMTCT Pilot Sites: Lessons and Recommendations (Durban: Health Systems Trust, 2002), pp. 25-27. 
72 Ibid, pp. 25-27. 
73 High Court of South Mrica, Transvaal Provincial Division, Minister of Health vs. Treatment Action 












MTCT, a pregnant woman must first know her HIV status. Women who test HIV-
positive would then need to be counselied about PMTct interVentions. HIV 
counselling and testing programmes require additional trained staff, leading to 
additional costs for the health care system. 
As part of a counselling programme, an HIV -positive woman also would need 
to be informed that AZf or Nevirapine alone cannot prevent the HIV transmission 
from mother to child. While AZf and Nevirapine significantly reduce MTCI' during 
labour and delivery, the drugs are not effective in preventingMTCT through breast 
milk. As was demonstrated in the statistics cited above, a child born HIV negative 
due to the provision of AZf or Nevirapine can be infected with HIV through breast 
milk. Thus, a comprehensive PMTCT programme should include provision of 
formula feed to replace breast milk. Exclusive use of formula feed, in lieu of 
breastfeeding, can completely prevent MTCT through breast milk. Notably, the 
provision of formula feed also raises the cost of PMTCT and raises a number of other 
more complicated issues. 
Despite the challenges, in January 2001, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) recommended the drug for use in PMTCT.74 This recommendation marked 
the official endorsement of the drug by the international medical community. 
Given that advances in medical technology had made MTCI' largely 
preventable, and given the promising evidence about the efficacy of Nevirapine and 
exclusive formula feeding for PMTCT, the South Mrican government faced the 
challenge of how to address MTCT generally and the use of Nevirapine specifically. 
Early National Department of Health Policy on PMTCT 
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act passed by the 
South African government in 1997 contained provisions that would later have 
implications for PMTCT policy. In an effort to reduce the costs of pharmaceuticals, 
the Act permitted parallel importation of medicines to South Africa Parallel. 
importation lowers the costs through the importation of goods produced by other 
countries at lower prices. The Act was particularly pertinent to the pricing of 
antiretroviral medications, including those antiretroviral medications developed for 
use in PMTCT. 
74 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health vs. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 












As early as 1998, the South Afri~an National Depattm~nt of Health took a 
fonnal stance on the use of AZf for PMTCT. On 2 October 1998, the Members of 
the Executive Council (MECs) for Health decided not to introduce an AZf regimen 
for PMTCT, a decision which was endorsed by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on 
AIDS. A statement issued by the Department of Health noted, "A detailed study in 
South Africa [had] shown that introduction of the drug would cost about R80 million, 
resulting in a further strain on an already limited health budget Consideration would 
also have to be given to the high dependence on breast-feeding in South Africa.'t7S 
In May 2000, the government released the HWIAlDSISTD Strategic Plan for 
South Africa, 2000-2005. The Strategic Plan set out to reduce HIV transmission from 
mother to child, calling for the implementation of clinical guidelines to reduce MTCf 
and improvements in HIV counselling and testing and familyplannirig services. for 
HIV-positive women.76 It invited the government to review and revise policy on 
antiretroviral use for PMTCT. It required the government to review, monitor and 
evaluate current research, identify additional areas of related research, and review and 
update national policies to reduce MTCT.77 Notably, the Strategic Plan did not 
discuss the provision of antiretroviral medication for PMTCT in the public health care 
systetp. 
Prevention of Mother-to-Child HW Transmission and Mamanagemenof(sic] 
of HW Positive Pregnant Women, released by the Department of Health in May 2000, 
elaborated the government's PMTCT policy. The policy guideline targeted at health 
professionals, discussed strategies for managing and reducing MTCT. The guideline 
examined various PMTCT interventions, and discussed challenges that HIV -positive 
pregnant women pose for care efforts.7s The documents provided a summary of 
possible PMTCT interventions,'9 with the notable omission of AZf and Nevirapine. 
The 13th International Conference on HIV/AIDS, held in Durban in July 
2000, focused national and international attention on PMTCT. Following the 
7S Department of Health. "Government Continues to Focus on AIDS Prevention," (1998) [Online). 
Available at http://www.doh.gov.zalmediaroomfmdex.hbDl. [29 April 2005). 
76 Department of Health, HIVIAIDS/STD Strategic Plan/or South Africa: 2000-2005 (Pretoria: 
National Department of Health. 2(00), p. 19. ' 
77 Ibid, p. 22. 
78 Department of Health. Prevenlion 0/ Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission and Mamanagemeno/[sic) 
HIV Positive Pregnant Women (Pretoria: National Department of Health. 2(00). . 
79 Department of Health, "Prevention of Mother-to-Child mv Transmission and Management of HN 













Conference, the South African government introduced a pilot PMTCf programme in 
the public health care system. The pilot programme provided Nevirapine and free 
milk fonnula to HIV -positive pregnant and lactating women served by the public 
health care system. The programme would be implemented at 18 pilot sites - two 
sites in each of the nine provinces. Of the two sites per province, one site would be in 
an urban location, and one site would be in a rural location. The availability of 
Nevirapine in the public health care system, however, was limited to the two test sites 
per province. 
One of the main objectives of the pilot project was to collect data that could be 
used to plan and implement a future, national PMTcr programme in the public health 
care system.so Mter the first year of implementation, the 18 site pilot programme 
covered some 193 health facilities, including hospitals, midwife obstetric units, 
community health centres and clinics. The programme served approximately 6,090 
antenatal bookings each month, approximately nine percent of the country-wide 
bookings in the public health care system.BI 
Controversy over Mother to Child HIV Transmission 
The National Department of Health's PMT f policies attracted a significant 
attention from actors outside of the government. Between 1998 and 2001, a great deal 
of controversy surrounded the government's PMTCf policy. 
In the late 1990's, an international disputeemerged concerning the 
procurement of antiretroviral drugs. The resulting conflict would have far reaching 
implications {or the use of antiretroviral drugs for PMTCT. In 1998, the South 
African government became embroiled in a legal battle with the multinational . 
pharmaceutical companies and in a diplomatic battle with the United States over 
international intellectual property rights and parallel importation. As was previously 
noted, 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act authorised 
parallel importation of pharmaceutical drugs to South Mrica. The legal and 
diplomatic battle effectively prevented South Afric~ from purchasing pharmaceuticals 
through parallel importation for some time. The high prices of antiretroviral drugs 
made it difficult for the South Mrican government to afford PMTCf pharmaceuticals 
80 Health Systems TrUst, Interim Findings on the National PMTcr Pilot Sites: Lessons and 
Recommendations (Durban: Health Systems Trust, 2002), p. 1. 












during the conflict. 
. In January 1999, the political rift over PMTCT in the South Mrican 
government widened when the Western Cape, the only province under the control of 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) party,&2 broke with the national government's PMTCT 
policy and commenced the country's fIrst comprehensive PMTCT programme in the 
public health care system. The programme began at two midwife obstetric units in 
Khayelitsha, a township outside of Cape Town. The programme provided HIV-
positive, pregnant women with AZr monotherapy with the aim of reducing rates of 
mother to child HIV transmission by approximately 50 percent.83 
A comprehensive HIV counselling and testing programme, established at both 
midwife obstetric units. accompanied the provision of AZr. In addition, follow up 
care programmes, established at nine clinics in the areas surrounding the midwife 
obstetric units, provided mothers with advice about the benefIts of formula feeding in 
lieu of breastfeeding and offering formula feed free of charge. The follow up care 
programmes included follow up check-ups for babies born to HIV-positive mothers, 
checking for signs of HIV infection and .performing HIV tests on the babies at nine 
and 18 months after birth. The Western Cape PMTCT programme openly challenged 
the national government's stance on the use of antiretroviral drugs for PMTCT. The 
programme demonstrated the feasibility of a PMTCT programme using antiretroviral 
medications. 
Despite the Western Cape PMTCT programme, cost of antiretroviral drugs 
continued to be a major impediment to the use of antiretroviral drugs for PMTCT. To 
fIght the high cost of AZr, the government and members of AIDS organisations, 
including the Treatment Action Campaign (T AC), joined in an unlikely alliance to 
challenge major international pharmaceutical companies and their drug prices. 
Pressure from the alliance led Glaxo Wellcome, makers of AIr. to offer a 70 perce~t 
price reduction for AIr to the South African government. The government and 
activists, however, were not satisfIed with the offer. Both parties wanted Glaxo 
Wellcome to make AZr available at or near cost.84 
In the second half of 1999, the results from the HIVNET012 trial 
&2 The Western Cape was the only provincial government not under the control of the African National 
Congress. The Democratic Alliance was not bound to national policy by party loyalty, as the other 
r:rovincial governments were. 
3 Fareed Abdullah, "'lbe Complexities of Implementing Antiretroviral Treatment in the Western Cape 
Province of South Africa," Development Update, 5:3 (2004), p. 249. 












demonstrated the potential of the cheaper drug, Nevirapine, for PMTCI'. In light of 
the ongoing stalemate between the South Mrican government and the international 
pharmaceutical companies, a more affordable alternative to AIr was incredibly 
promising. 
In mid-1999, following South Mrica's second democratic election, Dr. Mapto 
Tshabalala-Msimang replaced Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as Minister of Health. 
Dr. Zuma had refused to include antiretrovirals in the government's PMTCI' 
programme and Dr. Tshabala-Msimang represented hope for policy change. Within 
weeks of her appointment, the new Minister organised a trip to Uganda for a briefing 
on the lllVNET012 trials of Nevirapine. Upon-return, the Minister proclaimed, "We 
came back as a South African delegation absolutely inspired, absolutely motivated. If 
Uganda can do it, so can South Africa. We have fought many battles. We can't be 
defeated by a ViruS."8S As will later be demonstrated, this optimistic stance would not 
continue for long. 
In September 1999, the South African government reached an agreement with 
the United States government about international intellectual property right and 
parallel importation. The agreement allowed South Mrica to import patented 
medicines from countries that produced them at the low.est cost. Despite the 
promising news, Dr. Ian Roberts of the Gauteng Health Department noted, ''The 
government would still not be able to commence with plans to acquire cheap 
medicines unless pharmaceutical companies withdrew the court case they had brought 
against the government, or the court decided on the case."86 The ongoing legal battle 
meant that the diplomatic agre ment had little-bearing on pharmaceutical prices. 
In July 2000, the 13th International Conference on HIV/AIDS drew attention 
to the affordability of antiretroviral drugs and South African government's 
controversial response to the AIDS crisis. President Mbeki's personal affinity for 
dissident views on HIV/AIDS exemplified the government's response. In his speech 
opening the conference, the President spoke about poverty and its effects on disease, 
but refused to acknowledge the link between HIV and AIDS.87 The President's views 
. agitated national and international actors, attracting negative attention to the 
government's response to HIV/AIDS and PMTCT. 
as "Health Minister Holds News Conference on Retwn," Pulsetrack (22 June 1999). 
86 Robert Herbert and TIlembisile Makgalemele, "US Settles Drug Row with SA," Saturday Star, 17 
September 1999. 












Despite the negative reaction incited by the President's controversial remarks, 
the conference was a source of great hope for efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and 
MTcr. The results of the South African Intrapartum Nevirapine Trials were 
announced at the conference, demonstrating the potential of Nevirapine. The 
- spotlight on HIV I AIDS in South Africa prompted Boehringer Ingelheim, the 
manufacturer of Nevirapine, to offer Nevirapine for the South African public health 
care system at no cost for five years. The government, however, declined the offer.88 
Despite the promising developments, the government's reluctance to take 
action to formulate a comprehensive PMTcr programme in the public health care 
system continued, and activi,sts became increasingly impatient. In July 2000, TAC 
threatened the government with legal action if the government did not make 
antiretroviral medication for PMTcr available in the public health system.89 In the 
wake of these threats of legal action, the government agreed that it would formally 
discuss Nevirapine.90 TAC was limited in its pursuit of legal action by the fact that 
the Medicine Controls Council had not registered Nevirapine for PMTcr.91 TAC 
decided to delay court action, giving the government time independently to consider 
the use of Nevirapine. 
Despite the threats of legal action, TAC was also reluctant to take the 
government to court because it was unsure that the court would issue a favourable 
ruling. In October 2000, legal action became more promising when the Constitutional 
Court issued a ruling in the case of the Republic of South Africa vs. Grootboom. The 
Grootboom case addressed the claims of Irene Grootboom, a woman whose family 
was living in "deplorable-conditions" in a squatter camp in the Western Cape. Ms. 
Grootboom felt that the government was not taking reasonable measures to ensure the 
progressive realisation of the right to access to housing provided for in the Bill of 
Rights.92 
88 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
Strategies and Outcome of the Treatment Action Campaign Against the Minister of Health, " South 
~can Journal 0/ Human Rights, 19 (2003), p. 285. -
"AIDS Group Threatens Mbeki with Court Action." 13 July 2000 [Online]. Available at 
www.intiol.co.zalindex.php.?setjd=13&artjd=qw963505981288B232. [15 December 2004]. 
90 Helen Schneider, "On the Fault-Line: the Politics of AIDS Policy in Contemporary South Africa," 
A!,!can Studies, 61:1 (2002), p. 149. 
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The Grootboom case addressed many of the same provisions contained in the 
Bill of Rights at issue in the conflict over the use of antiretroviral medication for 
PMTCf. The Grootboom case dealt with section 26 of the Bill of Rights, discussing 
the right of access to adequate housing (section 26, paragraph 1). The case addressed 
the obligation of the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to ensure 
the progressive realisation of this right within its available resou~es (section 26, 
paragraph 2). The case also considered section 28 of the Bill of Rights, granting 
children the right to shelter (section 28, paragraph l(c». 
In October 2000, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling in favour of Ms. 
Grootboom. The Court found, .. 'No provision in the nation-wide housing programme 
as applied within the Cape Metro for people in desperate need.' Si~e that. 
programme made no provision for the relief of such persons, the government's policy 
was not reasonable.'093 
The Grootboom case was extremely significant for TAC' s efforts because it 
established that 'socio-economic rights are justiciable,94 and that the court had a right 
to intervene in instances where the government was clearly acting in opposition to the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The case would be the basis for TAC'ssubsequent 
pursuit of legal action against the government. 
In 2001, the Western Cape PMTCf programme provided encouraging 
evidence of the potential for a successfully implemented PMTCT programme in 
South Africa. The Western Cape rolled out the programme to antenatal and child 
health clinics throughout the province. By late 2001, the PMTCT programme reached 
approximately 50 percent of pregnant women in the province, with plans to reach 90 
percent of pregnant women by June 2002. and 100 percent of pregnant women by 
March 2003.95 The success of the rollout set an example for a future, nation-wide, 
PMTCT programme throughout the rest of the country. Furthermore, the prognfuune 
/-
provided a stark contrast to the inaction in the rest of the country. 
In March 2001, the conflict between the South African government and 
multin~tional pharmaceutical companies was set to come to a head. The government, 
joined by TAC, Medicins sans Frontieres, the Congress of South Mrican Trade 
Unions (COSATU), and other international actors, attempted to resolve the conflict 
93 Ibid, p. 672. 
94 Ibid, p. 670. 
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over pharmaceutical pricing. The dispute drew national and international attention, as 
the alliance spearheaded an international campaign to draw attention to unaffordable 
pharmaceutical prices. In the face of international criticism, the pharmaceutical 
companies withdrew from the court case in April 2001.96 The victory enabled the 
South African government to purchase antiretroviral drugs at reduced costs through 
parallel importation. 
Each of the events outlined above, which occurred between 1998 and 2001, 
influenced the interaction by the two main parties involved in the debate over policy 
on PMTcr. The subsequent discussion will highlight the role that each of these 
events played in the debate over the formulation and evolution of South African 
PMTCf policy. 
96 Andy Gray, Thulani Matsebula, Duane. Blaauw, Helen Schneider, and Lucy Gilson. Policy Chance 
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Chapter 3: The Origin and Development of a Policy Subsystem 
Chapter 2 discussed the advances in medical technology that made prevention 
of mother to child HIV transmission (PMTCT) possible. The chapter also discussed 
the controversial policy decisions made by entities of the South African government 
that inhibited the full utilisation of available PMTCF interventions. Lastly, the 
chapter highlighted some of the controversy that surrounded the government's 
reluctance to take firm action to plan and implement a comprehensive PMTCf 
programme in the public health system. 
This chapter will incorporate the previous discussion about the medical 
technology that made PMTCT possible. The chapter will emphasise how advances in 
. medical technology helped to draw attention to PMTCf, leading to what the advocacy 
coalition framework identifies as the creation of a policy subsystem. 
This chapter will describe the formation of opposing groups, or "advocacy 
coalitions." The chapter will examine the formation of a Treatment Action Campaign 
(T AC)-led advocacy coalition and the reactionary formation of a government-led 
coalition. The discussion of the government-led coalition will delve into key beliefs 
that formed the basis for the coalition's policy decisions. 
A Policy Subsystem Emerges 
In his discussion of the advocacy coalition framework, Paul Sabatier discusses 
the creation of a policy subsystem. He states, "~ most likely reason for the 
emergence of a new subsystem is that a group of actors become dissatisfied enough 
with the neglect of a particular problem by existing subsystems to form their own.'>9'7 
This description reflects the situation that evolved in South Africa concerning 
PMTCf. 
Throughout the early and mid-1990's, the South African government did not 
take action to address PMTCT. The primary reason for government inaction was the 
lack of viable, effective methods for preventing mother to child HIV transmission 
(MTCT). Initially, the MTCT was grouped in with the general issue of HIV/AIDS, as 
there was no impetus for MTCf to receive significant, isolated attention. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, the situation did not remain static. 
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Amidst a growing global HIV I An:>S pandemic, mediCiil community and 
phannaceutical companies began to study methods for preventing MTCT. Over time, 
a number of PMTCT strategies were identified, including the use of antiretroviral 
drugs and replacement formula feed. As was previously discussed, major studies 
examining the use of AIr and Nevirapine In PMTCT took place between 1994 and 
1999. The data collected from the studies demonstrated the promise for the fight 
against MTCT. Both drugs significantly reduced the chances that an mv ~positive 
mother would transmit mv to her child during pregnancy, labour and delivery. 
In light of the advancements in medical technology, various actors began to 
express their dissatisfaction with the South African government's inaction 'on 
PMTCT. The medical technology capable of preventing MTCT created an opening 
for the emergence of a new PMTCT policy subsystem. Civil society groups led 
efforts in the new policy subsystem to influence PMTCT policy. 
The Creation of the TAC-Led Coalition 
As early as 1997, civil society began to show dissatisfaction with the South 
Mrican government's failure fully to address PMTCT. Act?rs began to pressure the 
government to take action. Organisations such as the AIDS Law Project at the Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies, the AIDS Consortium, and the Perinatal mv Research 
Unit at the University of Witwatersrand lobbied the Minister of Health and the 
Department of Health to develop PMTCT policy. The goal was "to pressure the 
government to implement the 'steps to be taken to prevent peri-natal transmission of 
mv' listed in the 1994 National AIDS Plan."98 
On 10 December 1998, the Treatment Action Campaign was founded, 
grouping together a handful of previously separate activist organisations. The 
principal objectives of TAC, as outlined in the organisation's Constitution, were to: 
'\ 
4.1 Campaign for equitable access to affordable treatment for all people with 
HIV/AIDS; 
4.2 Campaign for and support the prevention and elimination of all new HlV 
infections; 
4.3 Promote and sponsor legislation to en.sure equal access to social services for and 
equal treatment of all people with HIV/AIDS; 
4.4 Otallenge by means of litigation, lobbying. advocacy and all forms of legitimate 
social mobilisation, any barrier or obstacle, including unfair discrimination, that 
limits access to treatment for HIV I AlDS in the private and public sector; 
98 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: BackgroUnd, 
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4.5 Educate, promote and develop an Understanding arid &,mmitment within all 
communities of developments in HIV I AIDS treatment; 
4.6 Campaign for access to affordable and quality health care for all people in South 
Africa; 
4.7 Train and develop a representative and effective leadership of people living with 
HIV/AIDS on the basis of equality and non-discrimination ·irrespective of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion, sex, socio-economic status, 
nationality, marital status or any other ground; 
4.8 Campaign for an effective regional and global network comprising of 
organisations with similar aims and objectives." 
Based on these goals, TAC focused its initial efforts on "raising awareness among 
people with HN of treatments, campaigning for lower medicine prices, and 
advocating the right to treatment using antiretroviraI drugS."IOO 
Through these efforts, TAC created a unified lobbying force. The TAC-Ied 
coalition included,but was not limited to, other nongovernmental organisations, such 
as the AIDS Law Project, the Legal Resources Centre, the AIDS Consortium, and 
Medicins sans Frontiereslol ; health professionals; academics; university students; and 
individuals affected by and living with HN I AIDS.I02 While it is possible to paint a 
broad picture of participation in the T AC-Ied coalition, the inner workings of the 
TAC-led advocacy coalition were likely more complex is apparent on the surface. 
Current infonnation does not prpvide a deep enough account into the dynamic among 
TAC and its allies to reveal the deeper complexities. 
Early in its existence, TAC and its allies used public action campaigns to 
assert their policy beliefs, with the ultimate objective of having these beliefs 
translated into public policies. TAC quickly assumed the position as leader of the 
advocacy coalition, taking up PMTCT as its fIrst campaign issue.103 Initial public 
action campaigns targeted the government. An additional public action campaign 
targeted phannaceutical companies to reduce the price of antiretroviral medications. 
The endeavours ofTAC and its allies were numerous and varied. Between 
1999 and 2001, the TAC led a sustained lobbying effort focusing on PMTCT. Mark 
" Treatment Action Campaign, Constitution olthe Treatment Action Campaign (2004) [Online]. 
Available at www.tac.org.za. [5 May 2005], pp 2-3. 
100 Marie Heywood, "'The Price of Denial," Development Update, 5:3 (2004) [Online). Available at 
. www.interfund.org.:ia. [22 May 2005], p. 98. 
101 Treatment Action Campaign. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) Report lor January 2002 -
February 2003 (2003) [Online]. Available at www.tac.org.za. [5 May 2005], p. 2. 
102 T AC also enjoyed the support of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
although COSATU was not directly involved in the conflict over PMTCT policy. COSATU's 
partnership with T AC was based on the recognition of the major impact that HIV I AIDS was having on 
workers. 
103 Helen Schneider, "00 the Fault-Line: the Politics of AIDS Policy in Contemporary South Africa". 












Heywood, Head of the AIDS Law Project - a major tAt partner - recalled that, 
'There were meetings with the first and second Ministers of Health, demonstrations, 
the drafting of memoranda, a 50,000 person petition to the President and a campaign 
that targeted phannaceuticaJ. companies to reduce the prices of essential anti-retroviral 
medicines and particularly Glaxo Wellcome's drug, Zidovudine (AZr)."I04 
The TAC-Ied coalition initially drew its influence through the public 
mobilisation. The coalition had little or no formal political power to influence the 
government's policy; however, the intense, public pressure placed on the government 
made it difficult for the government to ignore the groups. 
The Government Coalition Solidifies 
As the TAC-Ied coalition began to mobilise and apply pressure on the 
government to address PMTCT, members of the government consolidated an 
advocacy coalition of their own. The government-led advocacy coalition, as it shall 
now be referred to, was a natural extension of the existing government structure and 
the party system. The government-led coalition included key players in positions of 
decision-making power in the government, such as the Minister of Health and the 
provincial Members of the Executive Council (MECs) for Health from all provinces, 
except the Western Cape. lOS The coalition enjoyed the support ofThabo Mbeki, who 
held the position of Vice-President from 1994 to 1999, and assumed the Presidency in 
1999. 
While the government-led coalition encompassed a number of key 
government players, it is important to note that the coalition was not inclusive of all 
members of the government. Members of the government had a wide range of 
perspectives on PMTCT and available information suggests that there was some 
degree of disagreement within the government over PMTCT. Despite the absence of 
total support or a unified position, the government-led coalition's say in th~ debate 
over PMTCT was extremely strong because the government is the formal state policy-
maker. 
104 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child mv Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
Strategies and Outcome of the Treabnent Action Campaign Against the Minister of Health,» South 
A~an Journal of Human Rights, t9 (2003), p. 281. 
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The Debate Begins over PMTCT 
As the government-led coalition solidified, it also began to defend its position. 
During the initial period of debate over PMTCT, members of the government cited a 
multitude of reasons as to why they were reluctant to proceed with a comprehensive 
PMTCT programme in the public health care system. Generally, these concerns were 
related to fears that problems would arise as a programme was implemented. While 
some concerns were hinted at previously, the justifications for concerns about 
implementation difficulties expressed by the government now will be examined in 
. greater detail. 
First, members of government cited cost as a major factor inhibiting the use of 
the drug AZT for PMTCT. In a press release dated 27 October 1998, the Department 
of Health stated, "[The] government has come out iIi support of the Department of 
Health's decision not to administer the AZT drug to pregnant women." The 
Department added, "A detailed study in South Africa has shown that the introduction 
of the drug would cost about R80 million resulting in a further strain on an already 
limited health budget."I06 
In March 1999, the Minister of Health reiterated concerns abOut the price of 
AZT in an encounter with members of TAC at a Health Portfolio Committee Meeting. 
Dr Nkosazana Zurila stated, "We cannot afford the [PMTCT] programme because of 
the high cost of the drugs ... It would cost R500 to treat just one pregnant woman and 
that is too much."lo7 
In April 1999, the government appeared to have a change of heart. Following 
a meeting between Minister Zuma and TAC, the two parties released a joint statem~nt 
that affmned that "affordable treatment for HIV I AIDS and all medical conditions is a 
basic human right." In the statement, Minister Zuma appeared to change her stance, 
promising, ''The government would name an affordable price for· the implementation 
of AZT to pregnant mothers .and report within six weeks on the price and other issues 
pertaining to the prevention of mother to child transmission." The Minister and T AC 
joined together to call for multisectoral cooperation to pressure on the pharmaceutical 
companies to reduce the price of HN I AIDS medications. lOS 
106 Department of Health. "Government Continues to Focus on AIDS Prevention" (1998) [Online). 
Available at http://www.doh.gov.za/mediaroomlindex.hhnJ. [29 April 2005). 
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TAC actively collaborated with the government to pressure pharmaceutical 
companies to reduce the prices of AZf and Nevirapine. At a TAC-Ied protest 
targeting Glaxo Wellcome, the manufacturer of AZT,Mark Heywood, head of the 
AIDS Law Project, stated that "We are not the government's friend on this issue, but 
Glaxo Wellcome could be doing more to make AZf available at cost price. We are 
fighting for the interests of people living with HIV and for those HIV -positive women 
who are pregnant."I09 
Both the government-led coalition and the TAC-Ied coalition refused to make 
concessions in the fight for lower pharmaceutical prices. When Glaxo Wellcome 
offered a 70 percent reduction in the price of AZf. both parties rejected the offer, 
holding out for pricing that they deemed to be appropriate and affordable for the 
South African context. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the alliance worked together 
to fight international pharmaceutical companies in a court case concerning parallel 
importation of pharmaceuticals. The uncomfortable alliance over the pricing of 
antiretroviral medicines endured as the battle played out against the pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Second, the government expressed fears about the safety and side effects of 
antiretroviral drugs. In October 1999, President Mbeki ushered in a new debate 
regarding PMTCT when he questioned the safety of AZf. In a speech to the National 
Council of Provinces, Mbeki pointed out that there was one court case in the United 
States and one in the United Kingdom pending, both of which dealt with the safety of 
AZf. The President claimed that, "'The toxicity of [AZT] is such that it is, in fact, a 
danger to health." Mbeki ordered the Minister of Health to investigate the safety of 
AZf, adding that the drug would no~ be used in South Africa until its safety had been 
confirmed.IIO Rather than reflecting evidence from, scientific studies, the concerns 
expressed by the President reflected a penchant for the views of AIDS dissidents. 
On 5 April 2000, the Minister of Health, Dr. Tshabalala-Msimang, made a 
speech to Parliament, in which she further questioned the safety of antiretroviral drugs 
for use in PMTCT. The'Minister noted that there had been five deaths in South 
African clinical trials of Nevirapine. In light of the deaths, the Minister called for an 
investigation into the causes of the deaths. She also called for an investigation into 
109 Marco Granelli and Vivian Warby, "Mbeki Wants Lower Price for Anti-AIDS Drug," The Star, 29 
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the potential links between the deaths and the potential toxicity of Nevirapine, 
focusing on the high incidences of liver toxicity observed in the trials. I II 
Third, the government noted the need to consider HIV transmission through 
breast milk. In October 1998, the Department of Health issued a statement stressing 
that a comprehensive PMTCTprogramme would need to account for the high 
dependence on breastfeeding in South Africa li2 The 13th International Conference 
on HIV IAIDS focused attention on MTCT through breast milk. The Department of 
Health noted that, ''The research results coming from Durban which suggest[ed] some 
benefits and reduced rate of transmission in those [HIV -positive mothers] who 
exclusively breastfed." The Department expressed caution that, "In most of our rural 
communities, breastfeeding is crucial for infant and young child survival. Inthese 
communities, early weaning leads to early death from waterborne diseases."113 
The government highlighted the need to consider "the implications of the 
reversal of some of the benefits that attends continued breastfeeding in mothers who 
have been given antiretrovirals."114 It was argued that the use of antiretrovirals, such 
as AZf or Nevirapine, was pointless if not accompanied by efforts to prevent MTCT 
through breast milk. 
Fourth, the government drew attention to the development of resistance to 
antiretrovirals in newborn child who received the drugs for PMTCT. The Department 
of Health pointed out that, "Another fact that needs to be critically analysed is the risk 
of resistance to Nevirapine that formed the [World Health Organisation's] earlier 
reluctance to recommend Nevirapine for wide scale use in MTCT."IIS The 
government called for an investigation of resistance documented in the HIVNET012 
study in Uganda. 1I6 
Fifth, as the two sites per province pilot programme began, the government 
III Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, "Statement on Nevirapine Drug," Debates of the National Assembly 
Hansard, 5 April 2000, p. 2023. 
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began to express concerns about cap~i~; fit August ~0b0~ nt: Tshabalala-Msimang, . 
the Minister of Health; remarked, "We believe that we should expand the research 
sites on Nevirapine to all of the provinces so that we can improve our understanding 
of the operational challenges that would attend any introduction of antiretrovirals to 
prevent mother to child transmission in the public health system."117 
Following the United Nations Special SeSSion on mv I AIDS in 2000, the 
Department of Health expressed further concerns about the capacity of the public 
health system to manage the rollout of antiretroviral drugs for PMTCf. The 
Department explained that there were a number of issues: 
[the Department had] been trying to explain with not much success to those who 
advocate the wholesale use of antiretroviral drugs in our country without considering 
the lack of capacity to procure, administer and monitor these drugs in the public 
health sector. These are no excuses but real challenges facing almost every 
developing country, and South Africa is no exception. liB 
Generally, the truth and validity of the South Mrican government's claims as 
to why it was reluctant to proceed with acomprehensive PMTCT programme in the 
public health care sector have been highly contested. On numerous occasions, the 
government has been accused of running in the face of scientific evidence,. and of 
bowing to the theories of dissident science.1I9 The government has been accused of 
stalling and wasting time, rather than taking direct, concerted action to prevent 
MTCf. Furthennore, the government has been accused of prioritising political 
strategy at the expense of human life.120 Questioning the truth and the validity of the 
government's concerns should not lead to an exaggeration of the reality of the 
situation, as many of the concerns raised by the government were very real. 
The fonnal policy-making power of the government-led coalition. allowed the 
government's concerns to block the fonnulation of a comprehensive PMTCf 
programme in the public health care system. The TAC-led coalition's strong 
disagreement with the government's position on PMTCf would fuel a protracted 
conflict over PMTCf policy, which will be examined in 'detail in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4: The Evolution of a Policy Subsystem 
Chapter 3 discussed the emergence of the prevention of mother to child HIV 
transmission (PMTCI') policy subsystem, the fonnation of the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC)-led and government-led advocacy coalitions, and the initial debate 
over PMTCT Wlicy. As was demonstrated, the initial efforts by the TAC-Ied 
coalition to convince the government to change its PMTCT policy were largely 
fruitless. This chapter will delve deeper into the increasingly intense debate in the 
PMTCT policy subsystem, identifying the static and dynamic factors at play in the 
battle over PMTCT policy. 
This chapter will employ the advocacy coalition framework to highlight the 
most significant factors influencing the PMTCT policy subsystem. The chapter will 
discuss the relatively stable system parameters and the dynamic system eve tS that 
shaped the PMTCT policy subsystem. The discussion of the relatively stable system 
parameters and the dynamic system events will demonstrate the impact of both on the 
TAC-Ied coalition's ability to influence PMTcr policy. Ultimately, key dynamic 
system events created an opportunity for the TAC-Ied coalition to involve the court as 
a policy broker in the conflict over PMTCT policy. 
Influence of Key External Factors 
Throughout the conflict between the TAC-Ied coalition and the government-
led coalition, a number of factors external to the PMTCT policy subsystem influenced 
the prospects for policy change in the PMTCT policy subsystem. Paul Sabatier's 
advocacy coalition framework acknowledges the influence that external factors have 
on policy change in a policy subsystem. He acknowledges that two set~ of external 
factors - relatively stable parameters and dynamic system events - are of particular 
influence to policy change iii a policy subsystem. These factors "affect the constraints 
and opportunities of subsystem actors."121 
Relatively Stable Parameters 
The first set of external factors that affect policy change are the "relatively 
stable parameters," which include: 
121 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-












I. the basic attributes of the problem area; 
2. the basic disttibution of natural resources; 
3. the fundamental soci<KUlturai values and social structure; and 
4. basic constitutional structure . 
. Although these relatively stable system parameters are extremely difficult to change, 
they have a significant impact on the constraints and opportunities of actors in 
, pursuing policy change. l22 
First, the basic attributes of the problem area influence policy change in a 
policy subsystem. Sabatier notes, "Public choice theorists have shown how various 
. , 
characteristics of goods, such as excludability, affect institutional (POlicy) options.JOI23 
He adds: 
... aspects of the good or problemlissue area affect the degree of learning likely to 
take place. For example. a problem's susceptibility to quantitative measurement 
affects the ability to ascertain performance gaps, The extent of learning is likewise 
contingent UDOfl the ease of developing good causal models of the factors affecting 
the problem.124 , 
PMTCT programmes lend themselves well to policy-oriented learning. The 
successes or failures of a PMTCT programme can be measured quantifiably and 
quaiitatively.125 The initial implementation of a PMTCT programme can be evaluated 
by examining quantitative data, such as: 
• the number of health facilities offering PMTCr programmes; 
• the number of women accessing HIV counselling and testing; 
• the number of women accessing antire~viral prophylaxis; 
• the number of women accessing replacement formula feed; and 
• estimated number of infant infections averted. 
For example, data on the percentage of women offered HIV counselling and testing 
services, who agreed to be tested, can be used to monitor and evaluate the success of 
implementation efforts. Additionally, programme implementation can be gauged by 
quantitative data on the number of HIV -positive women who were administered 
antiretroviral prophylaxis to prevent mother to child HIV transmission (MTCT).126 
122 Ibid, p. 134. 
123 Ibid, p. 135. 
124 Ibid, p. 135. 
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Longer tenn quantitative data on a P'MTCf progiamme can be used to monitor 
and evaluate of a programme. For example, mother to child mv transmission rates 
for PMTCr interventions can be compared to projected rates of infection of HIV in 
the absence of PMTCf interventions. On a national level, mother to child mv 
transmission rates can be compared among provinces and among health facilities to 
d~monstrate the effectiveness of a province or a facility's PMTCf programme.127 
Additionally, qualitative data collected through surveys of both patients ~d 
health care personnel can be used to assess the extent and the quality of PMTCf 
services. The relative ease with which a PMTCf programme can be measured 
pennits analysis of perfonnance gaps. 
Second, the basic distribution of natural resources influences policy change in 
a policy subsystem. Sabatier states, ''The present (and/or past) distribution of natural 
resources strongly affects a society's overall wealth and viability of different 
economic sectors, many aspects of its culture, and the feasibility of options in many 
policy areas."128 
The link between natwal resources and a society's overall wealth is extremely 
complex. It was once assumed that natural resources enhanced the economic 
perfonnance of countries; however, a significant body of literature has questioned this 
assumption, demonstrating that natural resources detract from economic perfonnance 
in resource rich developing countries. Research h~ found that the economies of 
resource rich developing countries often grow slower than the economies of resource 
poor developing countries.129.13O Given the extremely complex link between natural 
resources and a society's overall wealth, it would be presumptuous to assume a direct, 
or even indirect, link between natural resources in South Africa and the government's 
PMTCf policy. An examination of the link between natural resources and policy 
options in South Mrica would need to be the subject of a more detailed economic 
analysis. 
In identifying natural resources as a relatively stable parameters, it seems that 
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Sabatier is in .essence highlighting the link between resources and policy options. The 
importance of resources to policy is undeniable. Without having to hypothesise about 
the complex link between South Mrica's natural resources and the government's 
PMTCf policy, it is possible to examine the impact of resources much more generally 
on the government's PMTCf policy. 
As was discussed briefly in Chapters 2 and 3, human resources in the South 
Mrican public health care system are limited. South Mrica faces a number of human 
resources challenges, including an overall shortage of health care personnel, an 
uUequal geographic distribution of available personnel, an unequal distribution of 
personnel between the public and private sectors, and the significant attrition of 
trained personnel from the country.131 limited human resources in the public health 
care sector severely constrained the government's ability to plan and implement a 
comprehensive PMTCf programme in the public health care system. 
Third, the fundamental cultural values and social structure influence policy 
change in a policy subsystem. In South Africa, PMTCf policy appears to have been 
fundamentally shaped by the social structure and by a handful of influential cultural 
values. 
Policy-making and policy change in South Africa is fundamentally affected by 
the social structure entrenched by the system of apartheid. Between 1948 and 1994, 
the apartheid system created an unequal, segregated society. During the 50 years of 
the apartheid government, the government carefully planned and implemented 
policies of "separate development," attempting to segregate all aspects of society. 
Inequalities in a country ate expressed by the Gini coefficient, which measures 
inequality on a scale of 0 to 1, with greater inequality as the coefficient approaches 1. 
Estimates of the Gini coefficient for South Mrica in 1994 ranged between 0.54 and 
0.65. Gini coefficients for other middle-income countries generally range between 
0.45 and 0.63, making South Africa one of the most unequal societies in the world.132 . 
Apartheid health care policies created an extremely inequitable public health 
care system. The inequalities in the South African health care system were firmly 
entrenched by apartheid policies that prioritised health care for rich, urban whites and 
131 Ashnie padarath, Antoinette Ntuli, and Lee Berthiaume, "Human Resources," in Health Systems 
Trust, South African Health Review, 2003-2004 (Durban: Health Systems Trust, 20(4), p. 300~ 
132 D. McIntyre, G. Bloom, J. Doherty, and P. Brijlal, Health Expenditure and Firumce in South Africa 












neglected health care for poorer non-white and rural pOpulations.133 In 1992 and 1993, 
the inequalities between health care resources in the poorest districts compared to the 
richest districts the public health care system were striking. Table 4.1 illustrates the 
extent of the disparities at the time. l34 
Table 4.1: Indicators o/the availability o/public sector health care resources 
b .. I d' . (1992/93) etween maglSterUl . lstncts 
Indicator ''Poorest" Districts "Richest" 
Districts 
Hospital bedsll ,000 population 2.1 3.8 
PopUlation per clinic 16,260 12,442 
Outpatient visits per capita 1.0 2.6 
Doctors (general and specialist) 5.S 35.6 
per 100,000 popUlation 
Nurses per 100,000 population 188.1 375.3 
Health Inspectors per 100,000 
1.1 6.7 
population 




Source: Mcintyre et aI., 1995 
In the 10 years since the democratic transition, ineqpalities in the public health 
care system have been reduced; however, the legacy of the apartheid past continues to 
impact the public health system. Inequalities in infrastructure, human resources, 
education, and financing continue to have an effect on the public health care system 
and people's ability to access health care through the public sector. Poorer and rural 
areas continue to have fewer public health care resources available to them than 
wealthier, urban areas. 
The>democratic government has been left with the difficult task of addressing 
the legacy of apartheid in the public health care system. Prior to the democratic 
transition, the Freedom Charter of the Mrican National Congress (ANC) called for "a 
133 National Health Accounts Project, "The Need for Health Care," in Health Financing and 
Expenditure in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2001) [Online]. Available at 
http://www.doh.gov.zaJdocslreportsl2001Ihfelchap02.pdf. [20 March 2005]. . . 
134 While the data examines disparities between the poorest disb'icts and the richest districts, the 
system of apartheid created a society in which there was a high correlation between race and class. The 
1995 Health Expenditure Review (McIntyre et al., 1995) found that approximately half of the South 
African population fell into the poorest two quintiles, and that most of the people in the poorest two 
quintiles were Africans, most of whom resided in the former homeland areas (National Health 
Accounts Project, 2001, 17). 
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preventive health scheme ... run by the stale," adding that "free medical care arid 
. hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young 
children."I36 In practice, the ANC has found that the legacy of apartheid in the health 
care system and the realities of limited financial resources have made this ideal an 
impossibility. 
Cultural values promoting breastfeeding also appear to have affected policy on 
MTCT. As has been previously noted, breastfeeding is problematic for mv -positive 
mothers because mv can be transmitted through breast milk. However, 
breastfeediog is a strongly engrained practice in a number of South Mrican cultures, 
linked to cultural values about the role of women as mothers and caregivers.137 The 
use of replacement formula feed, in lieu of breastfeeding, as a means of preventing 
MfCf runs counter to these cultural practices that encourage breastfeeding. 
Values promoting breastfeeding were reinforced by the United Nations 
International Children's Fund (UNICEF)"'and the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
and later by the South African government. In 1990, UNICEF and the WHO adopted 
the Innocenti Declaration on the Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding. 
The Declaration stated: 
As a global goal fOr optimal maternal and child health and nutrition. all women 
should be enabled to practice exclusive breastfeeding and all infants should be fed 
exclusively on breast milk from birth to 4-6 months of age. 1bereafter, children 
should continue to be breastfed, while receiving appropriate and adequate 
complementary foods, for up to two years of age or beyond. This child-feeding ideal 
is to be achieved by creating an appropriate environment of awareness and support so 
that women can breastfeed in this manner. 
In order to attain this goal, the Declaration called for "the reinforcement of a 
'breastfeeding culture' and its vigorous defence against incursions of a 'bottle-feeding 
culture. ",138 The Declaration shaped the breastfeeding policies of governments 
throughout the world. 
South African policy on breastfeeding was informed by the recommendations 
contained in the Innocenti Declaration. In 1995, the new democratic government 
created the Maternal Child and Women's Health Policy, which called for the 
promotion of exclusive breastfeediog as a priority of the Reconstruction and 
136 African National Congress, Freedom Charter (1955) [Online]. Available at 
www.anc.org.zaIancdocslhistory/charter.html. [13 June 2005]. 
137 Liz Walker, Reid Graeme and Morna Cornell, Waiting to Happen: HNIAIDS in South Africa 
(Boulder, Colorado:. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 50. 
138 UNICEF, Innocenti Declaration on the Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding (1990) 












Development Programme (RDP). The policy drove government-sponsored 
campaigns aimed at promoting exclusive bteastfeeding.139 The combined effect of 
cultural values, international declarations and government policy favouring 
breastfeeding solidly reinforced breastfeeding as common practice in South Africa. 
Forth, the basic legal structure influences policy change in a policy subsystem. 
"Basic legal.norms are quite resistanno change ... Basic legal traditions ... tend to be 
rather stable over periods of a decade or more."I<40 In South Africa, the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa is the foundation of the basic legal system. While the 
current South African Constitution only dates back to 1996 with the democratic 
transition, it is likely that the current Constitution will be the foundation of the South 
Mrican legal system for a long time to come. 
A number of provisions found in the Constitution shaped policy change in the 
PMTCT policy subsystem. In particular, provisions found in the Bill of Rights 
allowed the TAC-Ied advocacy coalition to assert its policy beliefs, while hindering 
the policy beliefs of the government-led coalition. 
Section 27 and section 28 of the Bill of Rights were the foundation for the 
TAC-Ied advocacy coalition's policy beliefs. Section 27 of the Bill of Rights states: 
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care ... 
(2) 'The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights. 141 
Section 28 of the Bill of Rights states that "(1) Every child has the right - ... (c) to 
basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services."142 These two 
sections buttressed the position advocated by the TAC-Ied advocacy coalition. 
Section 7(2) and section 8(1) of the Bill of Rights created an opportunity for 
. r 
the TAC-Ied coalition to assert its policy beliefs. Sections 7(2) states that 'The state 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfIl the rights in the Bill of Rights."143 Section 
8(1) states, 'The Bill of Rights applies to all law , and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state."I44 These sections allowed the 
TAC-Ied advocacy coalition to take legal action against the government to compel the 
139 Department of Health, Maternal Child and Women's Health Policy (Pretoria: National Department 
of Health. 1995), p. xi. 
1<40 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning 'Therein;" Policy Sciences, 21 (1988), p. 136. 
141 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 27. 
142 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 28. 
143 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 7. 












Development Programme (RDP). The policy drove government-sponsored 
campaigns aimed at promoting exclusive breastfeeding.139 The combined effect of 
cultural values, international declarations and government policy favouring 
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"Basic legal norms are quite resistantto change ... Basic legal traditions ... tend to be 
rather stable over periods of a decade or more."I40 In South Africa, the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa is the foundation of the basic legal system. While the 
current South African Constitution only dates back to 1996 with the democratic 
transition, it is likely that the current Constitution will be the foundation of the South 
African legal system for a long time to come. 
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Section 27 and section 28 of the Bill of Rights were the foundation for the 
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sections buttressed the position advOCated by the TAC-Ied advocacy coalition. 
Section 7(2) and section 8(1) of the Bill of Rights created an opportunity for 
. r 
the TAC-Ied coalition to assert its policy beliefs. Sections 7(2) states that 'The state 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights."I43 Section 
8(1) states, 'The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state."I44 These sections allowed the 
TAC-Ied advocacy coalition to take legal action against the government to compel the 
139 Department of HeaUIt, Maternal Child and Women's Health Policy (Pretoria: National Department 
of Health, 1995), p. xi. 
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Oriented Learning Therein," Policy Sciences, 21 (1988), p. 136. 
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government to fulfIl the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. 
The relatively stable system parameters set the context of PMCfC policy 
subsystem. The parameters created both opportunities and barriets to policy change. 
Given that these parameters are by natUre difficult, if not impossible, to change, 
. ' 
advocacy coalitions had to navigate the landscape, using positive system parameters 
to their advantage and downplaying parameters that were detrimental to their beliefs. 
Dynamic System Events 
Sabatier's second set of external factors affecting policy change are "dynamic 
system events." The dynamic system events that Sabatier highlights include: 
1. changes in socio-economic conditions and technology; 
2. changes in systemic governing co8litions; and 
3. policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. 
Sabatier stateS: 
By altering the constraints and opportunities confronting subsystem actors, they 
cpostitute one of the principal dynamic elements affecting policy change. They also 
present a continuous challenge to subsystem actors to learn how to anticipate and to 
respond to them in a manner consistent with their basic beliefs and interests. 145 
The key dynamic system events in the PMTCf policy subsystem will be highlighted 
briefly. 
First, changes in socia-economic conditions and technology influence policy 
change in a policy subsystem. Sabatier observes, 'These [changes] can substantially 
affect a subsystem, either by underm ning the causal assumptions of present policies 
or by significantly altering the political support of various advocacy coalitions."146 
As has been previously noted, a number of changes in socio-economic 
conditions and technology affected policy change in the PMTCf pOlicy subsystem. 
Of particular note among these changes were the development and endorsement of 
AZf and Nevirapine. The two drugs made it possible to use medical interventions to 
prevent MTCf during pregnancy, labour and delivery. 
Second, changes in systemic governing coalitions bring a new governing 
coalition to power with a new approach to a policy issue. 141 During the time period 
under consideration, there was no major change in the national governing coalition. 
145 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-
Oriented Learning Therein." Policy Sciences, 21 (1988), p. 136. 
146 Ibid, p. 136. 












Since the democratic transition in 1994, the ANC has enjoyed the solid support of the 
vast majority of the South Mrican voters. Electoral support for the ANC in national 
elections has been on the rise. The ANC won 62.6 percent of the national vote in 
1994,148 66.35 percent of the national vote in 1999,149 and 69.69 percent of the vote in 
2004.150 
In 2000, the Western Cape experienced a short-lived change in political 
power. In 2000, the Democratic Party joined with the New National Party to form the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), which took. control of the provincial government of the 
Western Cape. The alliance· only lasted into 2001, but the short change in political 
power provided the province with an important window of opportunity to .break with 
national PMTCT policy. When the national government began the two sites per 
. province rollout of Nevi}"apine, the Western Cape, under DA control, refused to limit 
the provision of the drug to the two test sites. lSI The Western Cape rollout became a 
shining example of a successful South Mrican PMTCf programme involving 
antiretrovirals. It highlighted the viability ofa multi-phased rollout. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated that a comprehensive PMTCf programme in the public health care 
-system could have successes in the South African context. 
Third, policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems affect a policy 
subsystem. Sabatier points out that "[s]ubsystems are only partially autonomous. In 
fact, the decisions and impacts from other policy subsystems are one of the principal 
dynamic events affecting specific subsystems."ls2 A significant number of policy 
decisions and impacts from other subsystems affected policy change in the PMTCf 
policy subsystem, the majority of which were mentioned in Chapter 2. These policies 
had an impact on three key areas: the affordability of antiretroviral medication, the 
use of Nevirapine for PMTCf, and the court system's ability to enforce provisions of 
the Bill of Rights. 
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act in 1997 
148 Independent Electoral Commission, (1994). "Elections '94," [Online]. Available at 
http://www.elections.org.zaIElections94.asp. [13 July 2005]. 
149 Independent Electoral Commission, "National Election '99: National ReSults Per Party," (1999) 
[Online}. Available at http://www.elections.org.zalResultsinatperparty.asp. [13 July 2005). 
150 Independent Electoral Commission, "National and Provincial Elections 2004," (2004) [Online). 
Available at http://www.elections.org.zalelections2004_static.asp. [13 JUly 2(05). 
lSI Nico Steytler, "Federal Homogenity from the Bottom Up: Provincial Shaping of National 
mV/AlDs Policy in South Africa." Publius, 33:1 (2003). 
IS2 Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Chance and the Role of Policy-












promised more affordable medications in South Africa, purchased through parallel 
importation. The controversy and legal battle with the U.S. Government and 
multinational pharmaceutical companies prevented the South Mrican government 
from purchasing pharmaceuticals through parallel importation, a practice which 
would have driven down the cost of medications. The ensuing legal battle over 
parallel importation effectively kept the prices of pharmaceuticals, such as AZf, at an 
unaffordable level, rendering a potential AZf rollout for PMTCI' financially 
infeasible. 
The September 1999 agreement between the United States and South Africa 
regarding parallel importation of pharmaceuticals created hope for price reductions. 
While the legal battle with multinational pharmaceutical companies over parallel 
importation prevented South Africa from engaging in parallel importation, the 
agreement with the United States provided hope for a positive resolution. 
The July 2000 announcement that the manufacturers of Nevirapine would 
make the"drug available in the public health system free of charge for five years 
further eased concerns about the cost of antiretroviral medications. Despite the fact 
that the government failed to take advantage of the offer, the offer was significant in 
that the cost of Nevirapine could no longer be cited as a credible reason for the 
government's reluctance to provide the drug as part of a comprehensive PMTCI' 
programme in the public health care system. 
The resolution of the conflict over parallel importation between the South 
African government and multinational pharmaceutical companies eased concerns 
about the cost of antiretroviral medications. In March 2001, the South Mrican 
government and the pharmaceutical companies went to court, and in April 2001, the 
pharmaceutical companies withdrew unconditionally from legal action following 
intense international pressure to do so. After the pharmaceutical companies withdrew 
from legal action, the South African government was free to purchase 
pharmaceuticals, including antiretroviral drugs, through parallel importation, a move 
that would lower costs of the medications. 
In addition, policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems affected the 
use of antiretroviral medications for PMTCI'. In January 2001, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) issued a formal recommendation of Nevirapine for PMTCI'. 
The WHO recommendation signalled an international acceptance and endorsement of 












cornerstone of a comprehensive PMTC1 programme in the public health care system. 
In April 2001, the South African Medicines Control Council (MCC) registered 
Nevirapine for PMTCT use. The registration of Nevirapine by the MCC signalled 
that the body had found the drug to be suitable for PMTCT, and that it was safe, of 
acceptable quality, and therapeutically efficacious}S3 Following the MCC 
registration, the South Mrican government could no longer credibly question the 
safety and efficacy of the drug, although they would continue to do so with 
diminished credibility. 
Additionally, policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems affected the 
court system's ability to enforce the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. The 
Constitutional Court decision on the Republic oj South Africa v. Grootboom case 
established that socio-economic rights are justiciable, 154 and that the court had aright 
to intervene in instances where the government was clearly acting in opposition to the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Grootboom case provided a foundation for 
TAC's pursuit of legal action against the government. 
TAC Changes Their Strategy 
Ultimately, the changes in the dynamic system events converged with the 
relatively stable system parameters to create a new opportunity for the TAC-Ied 
coalition to pursue ~licy change in the PMTCI' policy subsystem. Advances in 
technology made PMTCI' possible. Changes in the governing coalition in the 
Western Cape opened up the doors for to a new PMTCI' policy in the province. 
Barriers cited by the government as constraining the 'formulation and implementation 
of a comprehensive PMTCI' programme in the public health care system, such as high 
pharmaceutical costs and the absence of formal approval of antiretroviral drugs for 
use in PMTCI', broke down as pharmaceutical prices fell and as Nevirapine was 
approved by domestic and international authorities .. Informal barriers discouraging 
the pursuit oflegal action by the TAC-Ied coalition were removed following the 
ruling in the Grootboom case. 
New opportunities for influencing PMTCI' policy had emerged that prompted 
IS3 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health vs. Treatment Action Campaign (:2cX)2) 
Case No. ccr 8102, p. 14. 
154 Joan Fitzpatrick and Ron Slye, "Republic of South Africa v Grootboom. Case No. ccr 11/00. 
2000 (II) BCLR 1169 and Minister of Health v Treabnent Action Campaign. Case No ccr 8102," The 












the TAC-Ied coalition to adopt a new strategy. The coalition would pursue a two-
pronged strategy of legal action against the government. paired with public action 
campaigns. Legal action was a strategy of last resqrt, as it was acknowledged that it 
would be detrimental to partnerships between government and civil society; however, 
public action campaigns alone had failed to influence the government's PMTCT 
policy. 
On 19 August 2001, TAC officially announced that it would pursue legal 
action against the national Minister of Health and the provincial Members of the 
Executive Council (MECs) for Health. In a press release, TAC noted that lobbying 
\ 
~fforts ''to persuade the government to act urgently on [the matter of PMTCT had] 
been rebuffed." TAC proclaimed: 
In July, attorneys for the Treatment Action Campaign wrote to the Minister and 
MEC's for Health, requesting reasons why Nevirapine is not being made widely 
available to prevent mother-to-child-transmission o( mY, as well as a clear national 
policy on mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP). The Minister's response 
was unsatisfactory. ISS 
TAC saw themselves as the protectors of poor and vulnerable people whose 
constitutional rights were being violated by the government's failure to take action on 
the issue.ls6 
On 21 August 2001, TAC served the Minister of Health and the nine 
Provincial Health Ministers with legal papers"g((eking relief from the High Court for 
two demands: 
1.) ... the medicine Nevirapine, which is of undisputed safety and efficacy in reducing 
the risk of HN transmission during delivery and for a period afterwards, be made 
available for prescription by doctors and other medical professionals who work in the 
public health sector to pregnant women with HN ... [and] 
2.) that the government provide, or be ordered. to provide, a comprehensive national 
plan that aims to prevent mother-to-child infections, including provision of necessary 
services such as voluntary counselling and testing and formula as a substitute for 
breastfeeding. IS7 
On 24 August 2001, TAC called for public mobilisation in support of the legal 
action. TAC urged the public to take action through a public action campaign, aimed 
at: 
I. Getting more people involved in support of this sOcial and political campaign to 
make essential medicines to pregnant mothers and their babies. 
ISS Treatment Action Campaign, "Press Alert, 19 August 200 1: T AC to Announce Details of Court 
Action to Save Lives," (2001) [Online]. Available at www.tac.org.za. [14 December 2004]. 
1S6 Ibid 
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2. Convincing the MECs in all nine provinces not to oppose the court case and to 
start implementing the MfCf programme as widely as possible. ISS 
TAC hoped that legal action could be avoided should the Department of Health meet 
their specific requests. 
On" 18 October 2001, TAC issued an open letter to the Minster of Health, 
calling on the Minister to take action to resolve the dispute before the case went to 
court the following month. The letter ,reiterated the demands that doctors in the public 
health system be allowed to prescribe Nevirapine for PMTCf, and that the 
government fonnulate a comprehensive PMTCf plan. 
TAe appealed to the Minister to resolve the matter, stating: 
Legal proceedings were our last resort - they give people who have lost faith in the 
government a legitimate and legal avenue to defend their constitutional rights to 
healthcare access, life, dignity and equality. We appeal to you to abandon your 
opposition to the court case and to once again give people hope in the govemmenL 
The world was heartened by the unity we displayed earlier this year against the 
phannaceutical industry - we are willing to work with you in doing the right thing. IS9 
TAC was intent on pursuing their goals and defending constitutional rights of mv-
positive people, but was by no means intent on pursuing court action if it could be 
avoided. The Minister of Health showed no signs of submitting to TAC's requests. 
On 22 October 2001, the government officially opposed TAC's application, 
filing over 1,000 pages of replying papers. "The state opposed the TAC case on the 
grounds that the relief was unaffordable, that the efficacy and safety of Nevirapine 
was not fully proven and that its widespread use risked a public health catastrophe."I60 
On 5 November 2001, T AC lodged its replying affidavits to the legal papers 
submitted by the Department of Health. 161 On 22 November, TAC announced the 
details of a national and international mobilisation campaign to support the court 
action:62 On 25 and 26 November 2001, the mass mobilisation campaign culminated 
with rallies, marches and an all-night vigil of 600 T AC members outside of the court 
ISS Treatment Action Campaign, "Press Alert, 24 August 2001: T AC to Picket Provincial Health 
Departments and National Parliament," (2001) [Online]. Available at www.tac.org.za. [14 December 
20(4). 
159 Treatment Action Campaign, "Open Letter to Minister Tshabalala-Msimang and all MECs for 
Health," 18 October 2001 [Online). Available at www.tac.org.za. [14 December 2004). 
160 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child HIv Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
Strategies and Outcome of the Treatment Action Campaign Against the Minister of Health," South 
A~an Journal of Human Rights, 19 (2003), 296. " 
I I Treatment Action Campaign, "TAC Replies in MTCT Court Case," 6 November 2001. [Online]. 
Available at www.tac.org.za. [14 December 2004). 
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building where the case was to be heard.163 
163 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
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Chapter 5: The Involvement of a Policy Broker 
Chapter 4 examined the changes in the prevention of mother to child HIV 
transmission (pMTCI') policy subsystem that created an opportunity for the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)-led.coalition to involve the courts in the conflict. 
Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework acknowledges the key role of "policy 
brokers" in mediating conflict between competing coalitions, with the aim of reducing 
conflict between coalitions and finding a reasonable compromise between coalitions .. 
This.chapter will examine the involvement of the courts as a policy broker, 
mediating the conflict between the T AC-Ied coalition and the government-led 
coalition. The chapter will look at the initial case in the High Court and the reaction 
to the High Court ruling. The chapter will consider the subsequent Constitutional 
Court hearing, resulting from the government's appeal of the High Court's ruling. 
The chapter will highlight the Constitutional Court ruling and the implications of the 
ruling for PMTCT policy. In the end, the involvement of the courts as a policy broker 
in the conflict produced a favourable outcome for the TAC-Ied coalition - the 
government was legally mandated to alter its PMTCT policy. 
Initiation of Legal Proceedings 
The TAC-Ied coalition, composed of lobby groups, public health officials, 
academics and individuals affected by and infected with HIV/AIDS, had engaged in 
extensive lobbying efforts to compel the government to implement a comprehensive 
PMTCT programme in the public health system. When it came time to initiate legal 
proceedings against the government, supporters of the TAC-Ied coalition united in a 
formal legal alliance to oppose the government in court. TAC joined with Dr. Haroon 
Saloojee and the Children's Rights Centre as the three applicants in the case. 
The TAC-Ied coalition was supported by a variety of individuals and 
organisations associated with the coalition, including: 
TIle AIDS Law Project - one of the leading human rights projects for people with 
HIV/AIDS internationally; 
TIle AIDS Consortium - an- affiliation of more than 500 community-based AIDS 
organisations and [nongovernmental organisations]; 
TIle Congress of South African Trade Unions - the leading trade union federation 
with nearly two million members; 












TIle Southern Mrican Catholic BishopS Conference. 164 
In addition, the coalition was supported, to varying degrees, by allies of Dr. 
Saloojee and the Children's Rights Centre .. Dr. Saloojee was backed by over 250 
health care professionals, the South African Paediatricians Association (SAP A), and 
Dr. Max Price, Dean of Health Sciences at the University of Witwatersrand. 165 The 
Children's Rights Centre worked closely with the Coalition for Children's Rights in 
an IllY -Positive World, a coalition consisting of over 70 organisations in K waZulu-
Natal, concerned with health, development and legal services for children and 
families living with and affected by IllY I AIDS. 166 
A number of individuals provided invaluable support to the coalition through 
testimony in the applicants' favour. While many of the witnesses were not actively 
involved outside of the court in the fight over government policy, the testimony that 
they provided spoke to the core beliefs of the T AC-Ied coalition and convinced 
previously immobilised actors of the truth and validity of the coalition's claims. 
The role played by members and partners of the Western Cape Department of 
lIeaith was also of note. As was previously discussed, the Western Cape was 
planning and implementing it comprehensivePMTCT programme in the province's 
public health care system. While most representatives of the Western Cape were not 
openly aligned with the TAC-led coalition, the example set by the province's PMTCT 
programme provided compelling evidence, noted in the court case, supporting the 
arguments of the T AC-Ied coalition. 
As was previously discussed, the inner workings of T AC-Ied advocacy 
coalition were undoubtedly more complex than this basic list of coalition partners can 
convey. Current information provides a superficial picture of the TAC-Ied coalition, 
but does not delve into the deeper complexities. Given the available information, the 
basic description of the TAC-Ied coalition provided above will have to suffice. 
The High Court Hearing 
In November 2001, the Pretoria High Court began to hear the case led by the 
T AC-Ied coalition against the government. In the court case, the applicants argued: 
164 Treatment Action Campaign, The Treatment Action Campaign and Others v. The Minister of 














1. The state must make Nevirapine available to women who are mv-positive 
and give birth in the public health sector. The state must allow doctors 
clinical independence to prescribe this drug in the public health service. 
2. The state is obliged to implement and set out clear time frames for a national 
programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. This includes 
voluntary testing and counselling, anti-reuoviral therapy and the option to 
use formula milk for feeding purposes. 167 
The applicants based their demands on key provisions found in the Bill of 
Rights. These provisions, found in Sections 27 and 28, discuss access health care and 
the right of children to basic health care.l68 The applicants contended that the 
restrictions of Nevirapine to two test sites per province violated the constitutional 
right to access to health care, as well as the right of every child to basic health care. 
Additionally, the applicants argued that the provision of the Bill of Rights, calling the 
progressive realisation of the right to have access to health care, required the 
government to fonnulate and implement a comprehensive PMTCT programme 
throughout the country.l69 
The applicants' testimony addressed the issues at stake from a variety of 
perspectives. Witnesses from the fields of paediatrics, pharmacology, epidemiology, 
public health, economics and statistics provided specialised testimony on PMTCT. 
Doctors, nurses and other health professionals discussed the daily challenges of 
lllV/AIDS and PMTCT. lllV-positive individuals called for access to Nevirapine 
outside the designated pilot facilities. 17o 
Bu contrast, the government's testimony expressed concerns about factors 
inhibiting the implementation of a comprehensive PMTCT programme. Government 
officials and health professionals testified to the challenges impeding the 
implementation of a comprehensive, nation-wide PMTCT programme in the public 
health care system. 
The High Court Ruling 
On the 14 December 2001, the High Court handed down a decision on the 
case. The ruling, written by Judge Chris Botha, found in favour of the TAC-Ied 
. coalition. In the decision, Botha noted: 
167 Mark Heywood, "Preventing Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, 
. Strategies and Outcome of the Treatment Action Campaign Against the Minister of Health," South 
A~an Journal of Human Rights, 19 (2003), p. 294-295. 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 27 and 28. 
169 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health vs. Treatment Action Campaign (2002) 
Case No. CCT 8/02, pp. 4-5. 












... the real issue is whether the stepS taken by the flJ'St to ninth respondents with regard 
to the prevention of MTCr of IllV by establishing 18 pilot sties and confming· the 
dispensing of Nevirapine to those sites, can be considered to be a compliance with 
the obligation of the State in teons of section 27(2).171 . 
Reasonable measures to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to access to 
health care were dictated by available resources.172 
Botha asserted·that there was incontrovertible evidence suggesting that 
capacity existed outside the designated pilot sites, concluding that the respondents' 
policy limiting the use of Nevirapine to the pilot sites was "not reasonable and ... [was] 
an unjustifiable barrier to the progressive realisation of the right to health care.,,173 
Botha held that the evidence led him to conclude that the state did not have a 
"comprehensive and coordinated plan for a roll out of the MTCf prevention 
programme." He added: 
About one thing there must be no misunderstanding: a countrywide MTCf prevention 
programme is an ineluctable obligation of the State. •.. To the extent that the 
impression was created in the affidavits filed on beh8If of some of the respondents that 
the further roll out of the programme will depend on the availability of resources, it 
must be dispelled. The resources will have to be found progressively. The availability 
of resources can only have an influence on the pace of the extension of the 
programme. But there must be a plan for a further roll out.174 
Botha issued nine orders in the judgment on the case, ruling that the first 
through ninth· respondents were obliged and consequently ordered: 
To make Nevirapine available to pregnant women with HlV who give birth in the 
public sector, and to their babies, in public health facilities to which the respondents' 
present programme for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of IllV has not 
yet been extended, where in the opinion of the attending medical practitioner, acting 
in consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned, this is 
medically indicated, which shall at least include that the woman concerned has been 
appropriately tested and counselled.175 
Additionally, Botha ruled that the first through ninth respondents were under a 
duty and consequently ordered: 
To plan an effective comprehensive national programme to prevent or reduce the 
mother-to-child transmission of 1llV, including the provision of voluntary 
counselling and testing, and where appropriate, Nevirapine or other appropriate 
medicine, and formula milk for feeding, which progra~ must provide for its 
progressive implementation to the whole of the Republic, and to implement it in a 
reasonable manner.176 
171 High Court of South Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division, Minister of Health vs. Treatment 
Action Campaign (2001) Case No. 21182/2001. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid 
174 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
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